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The Georgia prison system has a lack of inmate bed space and must outsource 
their excess inmates to 21 local option county correctional institutions and four private 
prisons located throughout the state under contractual arrangements. Host county 
governments receive a supplemental unpaid inmate labor force to perform public work. 
Inmates in private prisons do not work outside the prison walls. Private for-profit prison 
services corporations can easily determine their financial success through profit and loss 
statements but Georgia county governments and their correctional institutions do not 
have these types of financial documents and their financial success is difficult to 
ascertain. The objective of this research project was to explore the 21 county correctional 
institutions to understand them in greater detail, determine if their operations were 
financially successful, educate decision makers and the public about this obscure and 
unique method of incarceration, and perhaps develop a theory regarding operating these 
types of correctional facilities. A qualitative multiple case study was conducted of the 21 
county correctional institutions through review of public documents and telephone 
interviews with their wardens and finance officials. The participation rate from the 
wardens was 100%. The major findings were all the studied county correctional 
institutions experienced significant annual losses when audited revenues were compared 
to audited expenses except for one. But when cost avoidance was factored in of not 
having to hire additional county employees or contractors to perform the work that 
inmates perform, all the counties experienced a significant “profit.” Hosting and 
operating an optional county correctional institution brings significant financial benefits 
to the host county as well as the state.  
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The United States has the highest prison incarceration rate in the world. During 
2019, the U.S. held approximately 2.3 million people in custody which equates to 698 
people per 100,000 population. Of the 50 U.S. states, Oklahoma had the highest rate of 
prison incarceration with 1,079 people in custody per 100,000 population followed by 
Louisiana with 1,052, Mississippi with 1,039, and Georgia with 970. These incarcerated 
people were housed in various types of correctional facilities located throughout the 
nation and included federal prisons, state prisons, military prisons, private prisons, local 
jails and correctional institutions, juvenile correctional facilities, Indian Country jails, 
immigration detention facilities, civil commitment centers, state psychiatric hospitals, and 
prisons in U.S. held territories. As a comparison, other world nations have a much lower 
rate of prison incarceration than the U.S. For example, Cuba held 510, Russia held 413, 
Iran held 284, and China held 118 people in custody per 100,000 population during 2018 
(Sawyer & Wagner, 2020; Wagner & Sawyer, 2018). 
Prison facilities, such as the ones mentioned above, play crucial roles in all 
societies including protecting citizens from individuals that do not observe the formal 
rules of society through incarceration, punishing criminals to deter people from breaking 
the law, and providing rehabilitative measures to inmates that make it possible for them 
to reenter society (Cabral & Saussier, 2013; Mulch, 2009). State prison systems and 
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prison facilities are vital services for all levels of government to provide, are one of the 
largest expenses of government, and need to be studied.  
Project Overview 
This research project focuses on the Georgia prison system, how it evolved from 
no formal form of incarceration, to a convict lease system, to chain gangs and county 
work camps, and to more state prisons due to growth of the state’s inmate population as a 
result of increases in violent and property crimes and implementation of harsher 
sentencing laws that led to prison overcrowding. With prison overcrowding and the lack 
of inmate bed space, the state had to rely on county governments and their optional 
county correctional institutions and private for-profit prison services corporations and 
their private prisons to house excess state inmates. The private for-profit prison services 
corporations can easily determine their financial success from their profit and loss 
statements. County governments, on the other hand, congregate their correctional 
institutions among many other county departments with minimal financial segregation 
and no specific financial reporting making county correctional institutions’ financial 
success difficult to ascertain. The general purpose of this study is to explore the optional 
county correctional institutions to understand them in greater detail and determine if their 
operations are financially successful.  
Historical Perspective of the Georgia Prison System 
From a historical perspective, Georgia’s prison system had no formal system of 
incarceration during the colonial period from 1732 to 1788. During that time, justice was 
arbitrarily and capriciously meted out through corporal and capital punishment based on 
the British Criminal Code. When Georgia became a state in January 1788, the state still 
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had no formal form of incarceration. During 1811, Georgia Governor David Mitchell had 
the state adopt a penal code that moved the state away from corporal and capital 
punishment to a penitentiary system and appropriated $10,000 to build a penitentiary in 
Baldwin County near Milledgeville, the capital of the state before the Civil War. The new 
penitentiary was completed in December 1816 and received its first inmate in March 
1817. Even at this early time, the state strived to make the prison self-supporting by 
having inmates produce and sell products such as bricks, wagons, cabinets, saddles, and 
harnesses. Unfortunately, the prison workshops did not make the prison self-supporting 
which laid the foundation for a future convict lease system (Findlay, 2007; Mitchell, 
2003).  
When the Civil War ended in April 1865, Georgia’s public infrastructure, 
including its only prison, was badly damaged, its economy was depressed and in ruins, 
inexpensive slave labor was a thing of the past, and the state’s treasury had $6.54 million 
dollars of debt with limited access to capital investments. The state had to rebuild its post 
war economy but its leaders had no appetite to increase taxes to fund prison construction 
or maintenance (Raza, 2011). Several months later in December 1865, the 13th 
amendment to the U.S. Constitution was ratified and stated that “neither slavery nor 
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been 
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their 
jurisdiction.” That language along with federal and state case law set the stage for a post 
emancipation criminal justice system that allowed government inmates to be outsourced 
to private entities through a convict lease system and later outsourced to county 
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governments through chain gangs and county work camps as early prisoner management 
systems. 
Convict Lease System 
Georgia legalized the convict lease system during December 1866. Under this 
prisoner management system, private contractors entered into agreements with the state 
to lease state inmates to work on railroads, turpentine farms, phosphate pits, brickyards, 
lumber yards, sawmills, and coal mines. The private contractors paid a fee to the state as 
well as funded the cost of housing, feeding, clothing, transporting, and guarding the 
inmates. The private contractors had complete autonomy and control of the inmates’ 
working conditions (Allen & Abril, 1997; Lichtenstein, 2000; Taylor, 1942). The convict 
lease system benefited both the state government and the private contractors. The state 
received revenue, avoided the cost of building and maintaining new and expensive state 
prisons, and reaped the possibility of reducing or not increasing state taxes. The private 
contractors received an abundant supply of cheap labor and the possibility of maximizing 
profits. The Georgia convict lease system was promoted as an economic panacea that 
solved both the labor and capital scarcity problems the state was experiencing during 
Reconstruction to help lift itself out of its economic depression. This profitable but 
socially unacceptable prisoner management system lasted from May 1868 to September 
1908 when the Georgia General Assembly passed a prison reform act eliminating the 
convict lease system as a response to unflattering media exposure of the inmates’ 
inhumane treatment and cruel conditions, unfavorable public opinion, labor unions that 
feared the loss of paying jobs and lower wages, automobile owners who wanted inmate 
labor to build public roads rather than being leased out to private enterprise, Progressive 
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Movement reformers, and poor economic conditions that closed many businesses (Allen 
& Abril, 1997; Clark, 2016; Raza, 2011). Regardless of how the convict lease system is 
viewed, this initial prisoner management system established the method of outsourcing 
government inmates to private entities and later to public organizations through chain 
gangs and county work camps.  
Chain Gangs and County Work Camps 
The 1908 Georgia prison reform act that ended the private sector-based convict 
lease system ordered that state inmates must be housed and maintained at public state 
prison facilities or public county operated chain gang work camps staffed by government 
employees and funded solely by government revenues. Even though inmates could no 
longer be confined by private contractors, the private sector continued to play a role 
within the correctional system through the provision of ancillary support services and 
secondary facilities (Haley, 2013; Mulch, 2009; Todd, 2005). Georgia did not have many 
state prison facilities during this time and relied on county governments to secure their 
inmates at county work camps using the chain gang prisoner management system. This 
system was simply a group of prisoners working outside a penal facility wearing chains 
or other restraining devices under armed guard to prevent their escape. Georgia and its 
county governments supported this type of system because local public works projects 
could be performed on the cheap and year-round in the mild Southern climate. The state 
prisons and county work camp facilities used inmates to work on public works projects 
primarily roads as part of the Good Roads Movement. The Good Roads Movement was 
an economic effort to improve the transportation system by constructing roads and 
railroads to increase accessibility to the South, open new markets, and establish 
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manufacturing industries without raising taxes (Allen & Abril, 1997; Rodimtseva, 2010).  
By 1911, 135 of Georgia’s 146 counties at that time operated work camps that used state 
inmate labor for local public works projects. By the 1930s, the number of counties 
operating work camps increased to 150 of the state’s 159 counties (Lichtenstein, 2000; 
Todd, 2005).  
In 1932, Robert Burn’s book, I am a Fugitive from a Georgia Chain Gang, and 
subsequent film, I am a Fugitive from a Chain Gang, brought public outrage and nation-
wide attention to the chain gang system and the inmates’ inhuman treatment and 
conditions. By the late 1930s, the chain gang was slowly becoming obsolete due to the 
invention and use of new technology and machinery in the area of road construction 
thereby reducing the demand for unskilled inmate labor. During late 1943, Georgia 
Governor Ellis G. Arnall called for a special session of the legislature for the purpose of 
reorganizing the state’s prison system. The Georgia General Assembly passed a prison 
reform act that abolished chain gangs, modernized the state’s prison system, and created 
a Department of Corrections to be led by an all-powerful Director. The newly created 
Department of Corrections was given the responsibility of establishing a “program of 
wise, humane, and intelligent prison administration which will have for its underlying 
purpose the rehabilitation and reclamation of the inmates” (Rodimtseva, 2010). Even 
though the prison reform act abolished the chain gang system, the reform act did not 
abolish the county operated work camps but rather placed them under the supervision of 
the Georgia Department of Corrections. The county work camps had to meet minimum 
state requirements such as having adequate food and medical treatment, reasonable hours 
of labor, eliminating corporal punishment, and having the wardens, guards, and other 
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employees selected by county officials and approved by the Director of Corrections. 
During 1944, the Department of Corrections established rules, regulations, and standards 
in the areas of food services, clothing, medical services, recreation, vocational training, 
and religious services for county work camps to follow to be able to house state inmates. 
By 1945, only 84 counties were operating work camps that housed state inmates for 
public works projects (Allen & Abril, 1997; Rodimtseva, 2010; Wilson, 1945).  
During 1956, the Georgia General Assembly formally codified various laws 
regarding county work camps. The Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.) §§42-
5-10 et seq. stated that any county, at its option, may establish and maintain a county 
correctional institution for the care and detention of state inmates assigned to it by the 
Department of Corrections. The law also stated that county correctional institutions and 
their construction/renovations, if any, shall be subject to supervision, control, and rules 
and regulations of the Department of Corrections. In addition, the Department of 
Corrections has the authority to define the qualifications of the wardens of the county 
correctional institutions, mandate that the wardens be appointed by the county’s 
governing authority subject to approval of the Department of Corrections, and that the 
wardens shall serve at the pleasure of the county and the Department of Corrections. For 
housing state inmates in county correctional institutions, the state will pay the county a 
daily fee for each inmate to cover expenses of the local institution. If the state’s daily fee 
is not sufficient to cover all the county’s cost, the county is authorized to pay its pro rata 
share from local taxes. In addition, counties with correctional institutions are authorized 
to contract with other counties to work the inmates. By 1969, only 57 counties were 
operating county correctional institutions that housed state inmates to work on public 
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works projects. The number of county correctional institutions dwindled to 31 in 1992, 
23 in 2017, and 21 in 2020 (Georgia Department of Audits and Accounts, 2018). 
Growth of Georgia’s Prison System 
 Georgia struggled to manage its prison system and inmate population for many 
decades since the 1940s. A report entitled, Georgia Prisons, was prepared by the Georgia 
State Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights and released 
in 1976. That report indicated all the state’s 16 adult penal institutions were reviewed and 
concluded that the entire state prison system was plagued with substantial problems.  
Those problems included antiquated, overcrowded, and understaffed facilities, inadequate 
wages paid to correctional officers, lack of qualified personnel, lack of standardized 
rules, insufficient state funds for proper facility maintenance, inadequate medical 
services, lack of law books, and inadequate recreational and educational programming.  
The 1976 report also indicated, that due to the myriad of problems of the state prison 
system combined with high rates of arrests and convictions, one-fourth of the state 
inmates were housed in the 43 county correctional institutions performing work on 
county and state roads and other public works projects for a $3 daily fee per inmate paid 
by the state to the counties. The report also stated that county correctional institutions 
would be further relied upon in the future to handle the overflow of state inmates.  
After the scathing 1976 report that detailed the systematic weaknesses of the state 
prison system and resulting class-action lawsuits, Georgia began to close or repurpose 
some of its old state prisons and construct new prisons and other facilities including 
transitional centers and probation detention centers. At the same time of having a lack of 
state prison facilities to house state inmates during the 1970s and 1980s, Georgia and the 
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U.S. were also struggling with increasing violent and property crime rates due to 
precarious economic conditions of the 1970s that included high unemployment, extreme 
inflation, stagnated wages, outsourcing jobs to other countries, de-industrialization, 
business bankruptcies, soaring interest rates, excessive oil and gas prices, reductions in 
social spending, and a downward push on benefits and pensions (Kang, 2009; Nossal & 
Wood, 2004).  
As Figure 1 indicates, the U.S. violent crime rate consisting of murder, non-
negligent manslaughter, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault increased from 363.5 per 
100,000 population in 1970 to 729.6 per 100,000 population in 1990, an increase of 
100.7%. During the same time period from 1970 to 1990, the U.S. property crime rate 
consisting of burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft increased from 3,621 per 100,000 
population to 5,073.1 per 100,000 population, an increase of 40.1%. On the state level, 
Figure 2 indicates Georgia’s violent crime rate increased from 304.5 per 100,000 
population in 1970 to 756.3 per 100,000 population in 1990, an increase of 148.4%. 
During the same time period from 1970 to 1990, the state’s property crime rate increased 


































































































Property Crime Violent Crime
Figure 1. U.S. Violent and Property Crime Rates per 100,000 Population 
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from 2,577.1 per 100,000 population to 6,007.3 per 100,000 population, an increase of 
133.1% (U.S. Department of Justice, 2020). 
The actual increases in violent and property crime rates along with the public fear 
of crime and calls for tougher penalties created an environment for “get tough on crime” 
laws to flourish. To combat the increase in violent and property crimes that occurred 
during 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, the 1980s and 1990s ushered in several new federal laws 
including the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 
and 1988, and the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. These new 
federal laws focused less on rehabilitation and more on punitive measures, collectively 
widened the scope of criminalization, and ended indeterminate sentencing. The end 
results were new convictions, longer sentences due to three strikes laws, increased 
penalties for drug related crimes, mandatory minimum sentences, and reduced eligibility 
for parole and probation. The new federal laws also encouraged states to implement their 
own harsher sentencing laws and policies and established grant programs to hire more 
police officers, build new state prisons, or expand existing state prison capacities. To be 



































































































Property Crime Violent Crime
Figure 2. Georgia Violent and Property Crime Rates per 100,000 Population 
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eligible for these federal funds, states had to implement tough crime policies and satisfy 
performance measures that included increasing the number of persons arrested for crimes 
and sentenced to prison, increasing the average prison time actually served by violent 
offenders, and ensuring violent offenders serve no less than 85% of their sentences. 
Georgia received over $82 million in grant funds from this program from 1996 to 2001 
and used those funds to expand prison capacity and drug testing. The combination of 
increased crime rates and the implementation of new and harsher federal and state 
sentencing laws and policies led to a substantial increase in the prison population that 
resulted in prison overcrowding. By 1986, 38 states’ prison systems were either at full or 
above capacity and seven states exceeded capacity by over 50%. As of 2014, the U.S. 
prison system collectively had an occupancy rate of 103.9% (ACLU, 2015; Aman & 
Greenhouse, 2016; Antonuccio, 2008; Chang & Thompkins, 2002; Clark, 2016; 
Gunderson, 2019; Khey, 2016; Kyle, 2013; Price & Morris, 2012; Welsh, 2008; World 
Prison Brief, 2018).  
Georgia followed the federal lead and during the same time period of the 1980s 
and 1990s, the state transitioned from an indeterminate sentencing system that relied on 
judges’ and parole boards’ wide discretion, broad range of prison, jail, probation, or 
monetary sentencing options, and liberal parole policies to a more determinate sentencing 
system that included “get tough on crime” laws and policies. Georgia’s truth-in-
sentencing laws encompassed mandatory minimum sentences, abolition or curtailment of 
parole, three strikes laws, recidivist statutes, and sentencing guidelines that mandated 
incarceration, longer sentencing periods, and clearer sentencing timeframes (Carr, 2008; 
Welsh, 2008).  
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The state’s overall increase in violent and property crime during the 1970s, 1980s, 
and early 1990s along with the counteracting national and state “get tough on crime” 
policies and sentencing laws that were implemented during the 1980s and 1990s resulted 
in new convictions, longer sentences, and reduced eligibility for parole which 
significantly swelled the state’s inmate population as shown in Figure 3 as opposed to 
general population increases. The state’s inmate population increased from 12,177 in 
1980 to 52,827 in 2010, an increase of 333.82% (Georgia Dept. of Corrections, Year-end 
Counts of Inmates, 2020). During the same time period of 1980 to 2010, Georgia’s state 
population increased from 5.4 million to 9.7 million residents, an increase of only 79.6% 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2020a).  
As the state’s prison population dramatically increased, the state’s small prison 
system became overcrowded. Between 1989 to 1993, Georgia inmates served less than 
one-third of their court induced sentences due to the unavailability of prison bed space 
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Figure 3. Growth of Georgia’s General Population and Inmate Population 
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Georgia elected officials knew they could not build themselves out of prison 
overcrowding and approved various state laws during the 2010s to reform the state’s 
criminal justice system including alternatives to incarceration. One of those laws was the 
creation of accountability courts that sends non-violent offenders to supervised treatment 
programs rather than prison. As of June 2018, there were 149 accountability courts 
operating throughout the state. These prison reform measures slowed the state’s prison 
population escalation for non-violent offenders leaving the remaining inmate population 
increasingly composed of violent offenders that must remain in the state prison system 
and cannot be assigned to county correctional institutions or private prisons (Berman & 
Adler, 2018; Georgia Department of Audits and Accounts, 2018). Since about 2011, the 
state’s inmate population has remained relatively flat while the general state population 
has increased.  
Today, the Georgia prison system, managed by the Department of Corrections, is 
a comprehensive penal system consisting of 34 state prisons, 21optional county 
correctional institutions, four private prisons, 15 transitional centers, seven probation 
detention centers, five residential substance abuse treatment centers, and two intensive 
treatment facilities housing over 50,000 inmates with an annual budget of $1.1B for FY 
2020-21(Angel, 2020; Georgia Department of Audits and Accounts, 2018; Georgia 
Department of Corrections, Facilities Division, 2019). For the purpose of this research 
project, only state prisons, county correctional institutions, and private prisons were 
analyzed. See Appendix A for a list of state prisons, county correctional institutions, and 
private prisons, Appendix B for a map of these facilities, and Appendix C for their 




During the previous three fiscal years from June 30, 2017 to June 30, 2019, the 
state’s prison system needed to incarcerate an average of 50,456 inmates. However, the 
state’s 34 prisons only had an average capacity of 34,726 beds resulting in an average 
utilization rate of 145% if other external resources were not found. During this time 
period, the state prisons housed an average of 37,772 or 74.8% of all state inmates 
resulting in an average utilization rate of 108.8% (Georgia Department of Corrections, 
2020a, b, c). The cost of incarcerating an inmate in a state prison averages $44.56 per 
inmate per day when controlling for offender sex, facility size, and facility risk 
classification (Georgia Department of Audits and Accounts, 2018). With many more state 
inmates needing to be incarcerated, the state needed additional resources and further 
relied on county correctional institutions.  
County Correctional Institutions 
The Georgia prison system has been outsourcing state inmates to county 
governments since the early 1900s through the chain gang system, county work camps, 
and then optional county correctional institutions. This arrangement was a cost-effective 
way for the state to manage the unavailability of state inmate bed space, relieve state 
prison overcrowding, avoid constructing new state prisons, defer expensive capital 
purchases, and continue their mission of incarcerating offenders at the same time allow 
counties to obtain a supplemental unpaid inmate labor force to perform local public 
works projects. Savvy county officials took a pragmatic business approach to government 
and saw the concept of optional county correctional institutions as a way for their county 
to obtain a supplemental unpaid inmate labor force to provide a variety of public services 
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to benefit the local community, save taxpayers’ money, reduce or at least not increase 
local taxes, and avoid the future cost of hiring additional county employees or 
contractors.  
County correctional institutions should not be confused with county jails. They 
are two different types of correctional facilities. County jails are secured short-term 
facilities operated by a local elected county Sheriff that hold persons that have been 
arrested and waiting for trial, offenders waiting for sentencing, inmates sentenced to 12 
months or less, or inmates sentenced to more than 12 months but waiting to be 
transported to a state prison facility (Albert, 2010; Bureau of Justice Statistics, n.d).  
During the previous three fiscal years from June 30, 2017 to June 30, 2019, the 21 
county correctional institutions contracted with the state to house an average of 4,825 
minimum to medium security male state inmates that have no special needs under long 
term contracts that renew annually. This amount represents only 9.6% of all state inmates 
that need incarceration. The 21county correctional institutions’ average capacity was 
4,992 resulting in an average utilization rate of 96.6% (Georgia Department of 
Corrections, 2020a, b, c). The cost of incarcerating a state inmate in a county correctional 
institution averages $21.63 per inmate per day when controlling for offender sex, facility 
size, and facility risk classification, well below the state prison rate of $44.56 per inmate. 
The host counties receive $20 per day from the state for each state inmate held to defray 
the county’s cost of incarceration (Georgia Department of Audits and Accounts, 2018). 
That amount was increased to $22 per day per inmate effective July 1, 2019. However, 
with the state prisons’ average utilization rate at 108.8% and the county correctional 
institutions’ average utilization rate at 96.6% over the previous three fiscal years, there 
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was a definite need for additional inmate bed space. To obtain more resources, state 
officials once again turned to the private sector to look at the concept of outsourcing state 
inmates to private for-profit prison services corporations. 
Private Prisons 
During the 1990s, there was a boom in the private prison industry. Between 1995 
and 2000, 204 new private prisons were built for federal and state prisoners (Price & 
Morris, 2012). During 1997, Georgia entered the private prison arena. The Georgia 
Department of Corrections, through a competitive bid process, contracted with Core 
Civic and the Geo Group, two private for-profit prison services corporations, to design, 
construct, and operate four private prisons. The four private prisons were constructed and 
opened during the 1990s and 2010s during and after the state’s implementation of “get 
tough on crime” and “war on drugs” laws and policies (Georgia Department of 
Corrections, Facilities Division, 2019). During the previous three fiscal years from June 
30, 2017 to June 30, 2019, the four private prisons contracted with the state to house an 
average of 7,859 minimum or medium security male inmates that have no special needs 
under long term contracts that are renewed annually. This amount represents only 15.6% 
of all state inmates that need incarceration. The four private prisons’ average capacity 
was 7,975 resulting in an average utilization rate of 98.5% (Georgia Department of 
Corrections, 2020a, b, c). The cost of incarcerating an inmate in a private prison averages 
$49.07 per inmate per day when controlling for offender sex, facility size, and facility 
risk classification slightly above the state prison rate of $44.56 per inmate and well above 
the county correctional institution rate of $21.63 per inmate (Georgia Department of 
Audits and Accounts, 2018). 
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Georgia’s Use of Resource Dependence Theory and Outsourcing 
The Georgia prison system did not have sufficient inmate bed space and was 
overcapacity due to always present fiscal constraints and limited resources. Due to high 
utilization rates and the realization that the state’s prison system was not self-sufficient, 
Georgia prison system officials were forced to search the external environment to locate 
possible solutions to their limited resource of inmate bed space to relieve prison 
overcrowding, avoid constructing new and expensive state prisons, and continue their 
mission of incarcerating offenders. In their search, Georgia prison officials found a viable 
solution by outsourcing excess state inmates to external county governments and private 
for-profit prison services corporations that possess the needed resources through 
contractual arrangements. By outsourcing excess state inmates to these external entities, 
the state’s prison system occupancy rate was reduced from 145% to a more manageable 
108.8% as of June 30, 2019 (Georgia Department of Corrections, 2020a, b, c).  
This solution is predicted and explained by resource dependence theory (RDT). 
This organizational theory offers a perspective in understanding interorganizational 
relationships and explains what strategic actions organizational leaders can take to reduce 
and manage their environmental dependencies (Davis & Cobb, 2010; Malatesta & Smith, 
2014).  
One of those strategic managerial actions is forming alliances and outsourcing 
services to other organizations to perform through cooperative agreements. Outsourcing 
public services and programs to the private sector or other levels of government has been 
around since the founding of the American republic and continues to be a pragmatic and 
innovative alternative method of public service delivery at all levels of government 
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around the world. Outsourcing Georgia inmates to private entities and other levels of 
government has been around since the end of the Civil War in 1865, was made possible 
by the ratification of the 13th amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and took several forms 
beginning with a convict lease system, continued with the chain gang system and county 
work camps, and ended with county correctional institutions and private prisons.  
Georgia county governments that host optional correctional institutions and 
private for-profit prison services corporations that operate private prisons have the same 
goal of receiving economic benefits by housing state inmates in their facilities. Private 
for-profit prison services corporations are totally dependent on the state to keep them in 
business and must maintain and increase their profits, market share, and stock price for 
their shareholders or face dissolution. The success of this private business model can 
easily be determined by profit or loss statements and other information contained in the 
corporations’ annual reports. However, housing state inmates in county correctional 
institutions is not a core function of county governments and is optional. County 
governments do not have the same concerns of profits, market share, stock prices, or 
business continuation that private for-profit prison services corporations have, are not 
dependent on the state to keep them in business, and can easily abandon this optional 
service to the state and continue their core local government functions. The county 
governments, not accustomed to acting like a private business with profit and loss 
motives, are actually providing a service needed in the marketplace but their success 
cannot easily be determined as compared to their private-sector counterparts.  
Therefore, the objective of this research project is to study the census of the 21 
Georgia county correctional institutions using a qualitative multiple case study to explore 
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how their operations impact the host county governments in the areas of finances, use of 
inmates, service provision, and avoidance of future cost to determine their “profit or 
loss.”  
Problem Statement 
The Georgia prison system has an excessive amount of state inmates and is not 
self-sufficient. Due to limited inmate bed space resources, the state prison system must 
outsource those excess state inmates to external organizations including Georgia county 
governments and private for-profit prison services corporations under contractual 
arrangements to relieve state prison overcrowding, avoid constructing new and expensive 
state prisons, and continue the state’s mission of incarcerating offenders. The private for-
profit prison services corporations can easily determine if their operations are successful 
through their annual profit or loss statements. If the private prison corporations do not 
make a profit, there is no reason for them to remain in business.  
On the other hand, county correctional institutions do not have annual profit or 
loss statements and are typically organized as one department among many others 
included in the local governments’ General Fund that are supported by various types of 
local revenues. This unwieldly organizational structure, lack of financial segregation, 
absence of specific financial reporting, and the inability of county managers and county 
wardens to see or understand that optional county correctional institutions need to make 
financial sense to continue operating makes the correctional institutions’ financial success 
difficult to ascertain. Measuring performance of county departments is a fundamental 
obligation of government managers to prove to taxpayers that departments are being 
operated efficiently. More importantly, there has been no systematic financial reporting 
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of county correctional institutions to determine their financial success due to a lack of 
information, understanding, and concern. Therefore, in-depth analysis needs to be 
performed on each institution to determine if these optional facilities are financially 
successful. Are their revenues more than their expenses? What benefits do optional 
correctional institutions bring to host counties? Are operating optional correctional 
institutions worth the effort for the host counties or are the host counties just providing a 
service to the state to the detriment of the county and its finances?  
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this research project is to explore the census of the 21 Georgia 
county correctional institutions to understand them in greater detail, determine if their 
operations are financially successful, educate decision makers and the public about this 
obscure and unique method of incarceration, and perhaps develop a theory regarding 
operating these types of facilities. This research project will shed light on how the 
operations of these optional correctional institutions impact the host counties regarding 
their finances, use of inmates, provision of services, and avoidance of future cost and 
inform county officials who operate these facilities if their operations have a positive or 
negative impact on their county governments. The correctional institutions that have a 
positive impact should continue and perhaps even consider expanding their operations. 
The correctional institutions that have a negative impact should consider restructuring 
their operations or closing since the county is basically providing an optional service to 
the state at the detriment of the host county and its finances. Lastly, other Georgia county 
officials and other states’ correctional officials that do not have this type of inmate 
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housing model can use the results of this study to decide if the results are transferable to 
their counties and states.  
The wide-ranging aspects of the correctional sector including outsourcing 
government inmates to the private sector is rarely the subject of scholarship due to the 
difficulty of obtaining information and confidentiality issues. The existing literature is 
dominated by academics and researchers with few insights from practitioners in the 
correctional career field. Furthermore, the existing literature narrowly focuses on the 
relationship between public agencies that outsource inmates and private for-profit 
companies that house those inmates and the cost savings achieved by the public agencies. 
Rarely does the discussion include the relationship and cost savings between one level of 
government outsourcing inmates to another level of government. Research on other forms 
of correctional outsourcing does exist but that research is regulated to the margins or not 
evaluated. Insights from practitioners and evaluations of various other types of 
correctional outsourcing between public, private, and non-profit organizations are needed 
to advance theoretical and empirical concepts to obtain a deeper understanding of this 
type of service delivery (Cabral & Saussier, 2013; Kim, 2019b; Montes, 2019).  
This research project analyzes and evaluates outsourcing state inmates to county 
governments as opposed to the private sector from a practitioner’s point of view and will 
fill a gap in the existing literature that strictly focuses on the relationship between 
government and the private sector and the cost savings achieved by the government. This 
project will also contribute to the public administration, public finance, criminal justice, 
outsourcing, and resource dependence theory application literature by providing data, 
information, and analysis relative to managing interorganizational relationships and 
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outsourcing state inmates to non-profit county governments rather than to profit seeking 
private enterprise. 
Research Questions 
The central research question is, “How does operating optional county correctional 
institutions impact the hosting Georgia county governments and their operations?” The 
specific research questions include: 
• Q1: how are the host Georgia county governments impacted in the areas of 
finances, use of inmates, service provision, and avoidance of future cost 
by operating optional county correctional institutions? 
• Q2: how much is the magnitude of the financial benefit or lack of financial 
benefit to the host Georgia counties that operate optional county 
correctional institutions?  
• Q3: how much does the state of Georgia and its prison system financially 
benefit by outsourcing state inmates to county correctional institutions? 
Significance of the Study 
This research project will have significance to several actors. These actors include 
the Georgia Department of Corrections, Georgia counties that operate optional 
correctional institutions, Georgia counties that do not have these types of facilities, and 
correctional officials in other states that do not have this type of inmate housing model. 
The Georgia Department of Corrections will be able to see how their outsourced inmates 
are being used at county correctional institutions and how those counties and the state are 
financially impacted from housing these inmates. Counties that operate optional 
correctional institutions will be able to see the direct impacts that these facilities have on 
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their counties’ operation and if those impacts are positive or negative. Georgia county 
officials and other states’ correctional officials that do not have this type of inmate 
housing model can use the results of this study to decide if the results are transferable to 






















The literature review for this research project builds bridges between various 
topics and links together a discussion of resource dependence theory, outsourcing public 
services to the private sector in general, and outsourcing state inmates to the private 
sector and other levels of government in particular. Each of these topics are discussed in 
detail below. 
Resource Dependence Theory 
This research project’s theoretical framework revolves around resource 
dependence theory (RDT). This organizational theory offers a perspective in 
understanding interorganizational relationships and explains what strategic actions 
organizational leaders can take to reduce and manage their environmental dependencies. 
RDT has its foundational roots from several scholars including Emerson (1962), Blau 
(1964), and Jacobs (1974). Emerson’s classic article Power-Dependence Relations (1962) 
and Blau’s work formed the fundamental concept of RDT using the idea of exchange 
between individuals which creates power differentials among them. For example, 
individual A is dependent on individual B to the extent that B controls resources valued 
by A and A cannot obtain the resources from alternative individuals. Such asymmetric 
dependence results in a power shift between them. Individual A is dependent on B and 
therefore B has power over A. Since power is not zero-sum, A and B can have power 
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over each other making them interdependent. Furthermore, Jacobs (1974) contributed to 
the foundational RDT concept by investigating how different organizations are controlled 
through the exchange relationship with their external environment. Jeffery Pfeffer and 
Gerald Salancik further refined this theory on an organizational level by authoring 
various publications during the early 1970s culminating in their seminal book, The 
External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective (1978). As 
Pfeffer and Salancik indicated, this theory attempts to explain organizational behavior 
relating to the acquisition of needed resources such as raw materials, capital, human 
resources, technology, information, and production operations from the external 
environment through various strategic managerial actions to reduce uncertainty, maintain 
stability, and ensure organizational survival (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Davis & Cobb, 
2010; Delke, 2015; Johnson, 1995; Klein & Pereira, 2015; Malatesta & Smith, 2014; 
Mensing, 2013; Ulrich & Barney, 1984).  
All organizations aim to be in a powerful position with maximum control over 
needed resources and minimal dependence on external sources to achieve a high degree 
of independence and certainty. A high degree of autonomy can free organizations from 
constraints on their decision making, increase power, enhance profits, and help ensure 
their survival. Conversely, a low degree of autonomy can create the loss of decision- 
making latitudes, discretion, and control which are factors organizations deem to be 
detrimental. However, no organization is self-sufficient and organizational leaders must 
look outside their corporate boundaries and depend on and adapt to the unreliable 
external environment to acquire needed resources for their organization to maintain 
stability, carry out its mission, and survive. Organizations can be at one end of the 
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dependence continuum or the other. At one end is the resource rich and powerful 
organization that exercises a high degree of independence and control over others. On the 
other end is the captive and powerless organization that is greatly dependent on other 
organizations in its environment for resources (Barringer & Harrison, 2000; Johnson, 
1995; Kessler, 2013; Oliver, 1990). 
Resource dependence theory is based on a few straightforward principles 
including a) all organizations need various resources to pursue their goals and survive, b) 
resource acquisitions from others are uncertain and undependable, c) organizations are 
motivated by solving resource scarcity problems and being effective rather than 
producing internal efficiencies and cost savings, d) organizations can cope with and 
manage uncertainty and dependency by understanding their external environment and 
negotiating and exchanging resources with that environment through intentional and 
strategic managerial actions with other organizations making both organizations 
interdependent, and e) exchanged-based power plays a key role in understanding 
organizational relationships (Johnson, 1995; Malatesta & Smith, 2014). As Johnson 
(1995) and Oliver (1990) further stated, those interdependent relationships can be either 
dependent, reciprocal, or dominant.  
Strategic Managerial Actions 
This theory details various strategic actions that organizational leaders can take to 
gain access to resources controlled by others to manage and reduce their resource 
uncertainty, dependency, and vulnerability. Those managerial actions include forming 
alliances, creating joint ventures, using co-optations or interlocks, crafting mergers and 
acquisitions, taking political action, and instituting executive succession (Davis & Cobb, 
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2010; Delke, 2015; Hillman et al., 2009; Johnson, 1995; Kessler, 2013; Malatesta & 
Smith, 2014; Mensing, 2013; Pfeffer, 1972). Those strategic managerial actions are more 
fully described as follows.  
Alliances involve voluntary cooperative agreements between two or more 
organizations to pursue joint objectives through a coordination of activities, outsourcing, 
or sharing knowledge and resources. These cooperative agreements can be simple and 
flexible short-term transaction agreements or complicated long-term service delivery 
arrangements for critical resources. This action requires a low level of coordination and 
organizations can maintain their autonomy. The benefits of creating alliances are cost 
reductions, diffusion of risk, and a sense of community.  
Joint ventures are the creation of a new organizational entity by two or more 
independent partners to have closer and more powerful ties to suppliers that result in 
enhanced organizational performance.  
Board co-optations and interlocks are actions taken by a dependent organization 
that invites external representatives onto its governing board of directors who can be 
classified as business experts, support specialists, or community influencers that have 
needed resources that can help the organization legally gain allies who are tied to the 
board and have a vested interest in the organization’s survival. Governing directors bring 
a variety of benefits to organizations they serve including advice and counsel, channels of 
information flows, preferential access to resources, and legitimacy. Governing board size 
and composition are not random decisions but are made intentionally to respond to the 
external environment. Organizations with greater external dependencies or are highly 
regulated require a higher ratio of external governing directors and those directors need to 
28 
 
be specific resource-rich partners who have access to resources needed by the 
organization and have interlocks with other governing boards. Lastly, governing board 
composition needs to change as the organization’s external environment changes. If the 
governing board composition does not change to meet new or changing environmental 
demands, needed resources may not be obtainable and organizational performance may 
suffer.  
Mergers and acquisitions are the most constraining method of managing 
interdependence where an organization acquires another organization as a method of 
extending control over them and managing resource exchanges vital to its operation.  
This action involves greater levels of coordination and commitment and often entails loss 
of organizational autonomy and identity. Mergers and acquisitions can be vertical where 
organizations acquire suppliers and buyers, horizontal where organizations acquire 
competitors, or diversified where organizations with different services or activities are 
acquired. Merger and acquisition activities are generally motivated by a desire to reduce 
competition by absorbing competitors, gaining competitive leverage, introducing 
economies of scale, and improving effectiveness.  
Organizations sometime use political actions and means to reshape government 
regulations as ways to alter the existing external environment to create more favorable 
conditions for their interests. Organizations that are heavily dependent on or regulated by 
the government are more likely to engage in political activities and appoint former 




Executive succession is an internally focused way for organizations to manage 
external environmental dependencies. Organizations that have capable executives can 
cope with external environmental dependencies and if those executives cannot cope, they 
will need to be replaced. Organizations that are more dependent on the external 
environment for resources are more uncertain, vulnerable, and unpredictable and will 
typically experience a higher rate of executive turnover.  
Theory Issues and Concerns 
Since the time of RDT’s creation in the 1960s and its further evolution during the 
1970s, this foundational theory has been applied as an approach to predict and explain 
organizational behavior and what strategic actions organizational leaders can take to 
manage their environmental dependencies. However, Barringer and Harrison (2000) 
argued that despite the popularity and benefits of interorganizational relationships, these 
relationships are difficult to manage due to the need to combine different cultures of two 
or more organizations. If one partner becomes overly dependent on the other, a power 
imbalance will occur increasing the potential for opportunism on part of the stronger 
partner. Oliver (1990) echoed the same concerns stating that interconnected 
environments, where organizations operate, can be characterized by injustice, information 
distortion, manipulation, exploitation, coercion, inequality, and conflict. However, with 
all its benefits and difficulties, RDT is a widely accepted and often cited organizational 
theory and its strategic managerial actions are still relevant and influential today 





Applying this organizational theory to this research project, Georgia prison 
officials realized that their organization was not self-sufficient by not having enough 
inmate bed space which affected their ability to carry out their mission of incarcerating 
offenders and looked to the external environment to solve their problem. State prison 
officials solved their problem by using one of RDT’s managerial strategies of forming 
alliances with external organizations that possess needed resources including private 
entities initially, then county governments, and lastly private for-profit prison services 
corporations and negotiating with them to house state inmates through contractual 
agreements. By outsourcing state inmates to these external organizations, the Georgia 
prison system managed its resource dependency, became more stable to carry out its 
mission of incarcerating offenders, reduced its uncertainty and vulnerability, and became 
interdependent with the external organizations which shifted power among the players.  
Outsourcing Public Services in General 
In general, government outsourcing is an arrangement whereby a government 
agency determines what public services are suitable to be performed by the private sector 
or other organizations based on fiscal pressures, political forces, bureaucratic capabilities, 
market conditions, or lack of resources. The most suitable services for outsourcing are 
those at the top of the maturity spectrum, understood well enough to be standardized and 
automated to “plug and play,” measurable and marketable, and connected to external 
partners. After selecting which public services are best suited for outsourcing, a 
government agency prepares detailed bid specifications, conducts a competition, 
evaluates the responses, makes an award, and enters into and monitors a contract with a 
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private company, non-profit organization, or another level of government that has the 
expertise, resources, and innovative technologies to provide goods or deliver services and 
programs which have typically been provided by the originating government. This 
concept relies less on government and more on the private sector and other organizations. 
Government’s role has changed and continues to change from service provider to service 
broker and increasingly relies on networks of private and non-profit organizations as well 
as other levels of government to deliver public services. Outsourcing public services, 
a.k.a. contracting out, is a structural compromise of providing government services and 
maintaining control while having the services performed by the private sector or other 
organizations. Outsourcing has evolved from a partisan or ideological issue to a 
pragmatic, innovative, and well-established alternative to traditional public service 
delivery (Aman & Greenhouse, 2016; Feeney & Smith, 2008; Gilroy, 2010; Girth et al., 
2012; Hefetz & Warner, 2011; Hwang, 2014; Jensen & Stonecash, 2004; Lochlainn & 
Collins, 2015; Tan & Sia, 2006; Zhang & Sun, 2012).  
The main reason for outsourcing public services to the private sector is the 
assumption that the private sector through competition for contracts, profit-seeking 
motivations, and freedom from political interference can provide public services more 
efficiently with higher quality and at a lower cost through more efficient work practices, 
economies of scale, innovations, labor shedding, increases in work intensity, and 
substitution of capital for labor than monopolistic systems of government. However, it is 
naïve to assume that the private sector is inherently more efficient than the public sector. 
Empirical evidence supports the fact that competition for services was the driving force 
of cost savings, not asset ownership (Jensen & Stonecash, 2004; Poutvaara, 2014).  
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Outsourcing public services to the private sector, non-profit organizations, or 
other levels of government accomplishes many goals when designed, implemented, and 
monitored properly. Those goals include enhancing government operational efficiency, 
reducing the number of government employees, decreasing the overall cost and size of 
government, increasing the quality and flexibility of government services, taking 
advantage of specialized skills of experts and advanced technology not generally 
available in government, managing risk, allowing governments to avoid expensive capital 
purchases, and having access to needed resources. Outsourcing also helps senior 
government managers achieve best practices, benefit from the value added that external 
expert service delivery provides, and focus more clearly on the core competencies of the 
organization. Outsourcing can also act as a strong response to declining financial 
resources, fluctuating demand, or additional new projects and workloads (Featherstun et 
al., 2001; Gilroy, 2010; Jensen & Stonecash, 2004; Kakabadse & Kakadabse, 2001).  
Even though the terms outsourcing, privatization, and public-private partnerships 
(P3) are related and used interchangeably, outsourcing should not be confused with 
privatization or P3. Outsourcing allows the government to provide goods, services, and 
programs through the private sector or other organizations typically through a 
competitive process but the government retains control, public oversight, responsibility, 
and accountability of those goods, services, and programs through performance criteria 
contained in the contractual arrangement. Outsourcing does not transfer ownership of 
physical public assets to the private sector or other organizations and those organizations 
that perform services do not have an equity/ownership interest in the public services 
being outsourced. Privatization, on the other hand, involves the actual selling or 
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transferring of physical public assets to the private sector or other organizations to allow 
them to control the use of those assets, charge user fees, retain any profits made, and even 
resell the acquired assets. Privatization rests on the belief that market-based activities are 
a better creator of public value than publicly operated services and programs. Lastly, 
public-private partnerships are a type of collaborative arrangement government uses 
when public projects are too complex, have higher degrees of risks, and when 
government capabilities are not suited to meet the project’s objectives. This type of 
collaboration has the ability to decrease costs, lower risks, and increase efficiency and 
effectiveness (Jensen & Stonecash, 2005; Miller, 2018; Poutvaara, 2014; Wang et al., 
2018). 
Evolution of Outsourcing Public Services 
The United States has had a deep tradition of using private power rather than 
public administrative capacity to solve public problems (Lu, 2013). Outsourcing 
government goods, services, and programs to the private sector and other levels of 
government has been around since the founding of the American republic. During the 
Revolutionary War, George Washington’s army purchased ammunition, clothing, food, 
and shoes from private contractors. In 1785, the Continental Congress authorized the 
Postmaster General to outsource the transport of mail among various cities on the eastern 
seaboard. During the 1950s, the new city of Lakewood, California, upon incorporation, 
began an innovative concept of having the county government provide all its municipal 
services through fee-for-service contracts. This arrangement, known as the Lakewood 
Plan, allowed cities to provide municipal services at a reduced cost by relying on the 
concept of economies of scale provided by the larger county government (Prager, 2008; 
34 
 
Price & Morris, 2012). During the late 1970s and 1980s with the public’s disillusionment 
of big government, large public deficits, overloaded welfare state, and successful anti-tax 
movements such as California’s Proposition 13 in 1978 that limited the amount of 
property taxes paid to the state that resulted in a “do more with less” mentality, 
outsourcing of government services saw an increase of use as a reform measure promoted 
by the New Public Management (NPM) movement (Lane, 2013; Price & Morris, 2012; 
Zhang & Sun, 2012).  
The NPM movement introduced private sector business methods, market-based 
competition, and a customer centric service orientation to the public sector to improve 
public services and make government work better and cost less (Denhardt & Denhardt, 
2000; Walther, 2015). NPM practices shook the foundation of traditional centralized 
Weberian bureaucracies that were known for providing services directly to the public 
with excessive rules, rigid budgeting, and inflexible personnel systems preoccupied with 
control and replaced that foundation with a more decentralized organizational structure 
possessing market-oriented approaches, customer service orientations, and modern 
businesses techniques such as outsourcing (Andrews & Van de Walle, 2013). Since the 
1980s, all levels of government have initiated efforts to increase efficiency and find 
alternative service delivery mechanisms.  
Outsourcing government services to the private sector captured the interest of 
President Reagan due to its concepts of economic competitiveness, being a driver of 
innovation and efficiency, and reducing the size of government. In 1983, the federal 
Office of Management and Budget’s Circular A-76 (Performance of Commercial 
Activities) served as President Reagan’s blueprint for government departments and 
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agencies to actively pursue outsourcing (Prager, 2008). During September 1987, 
President Reagan issued Executive Order 12607 that created the President’s Commission 
on Privatization. That Commission’s charge was to “review the appropriate division of 
responsibilities between the federal government and the private sector and to identify 
those government programs that are not properly the responsibility of the federal 
government or can be performed more efficiently by the private sector” (Baizas, 2014). 
In March 1988, the Commission issued its report entitled, Privatization Toward More 
Efficient Government, and concluded that numerous government activities can be 
privatized or outsourced to the private sector including low-income housing programs, 
federal loan programs, educational choice, prisons, and the sale of federal assets 
including Amtrak and the Naval Petroleum Reserves (Baizas, 2014).  
The Clinton administration, beginning in March 1993, further promoted 
outsourcing with its National Performance Review (NPR) that was modeled after a 1992 
book entitled, Reinventing Government, by David Osborne and Ted Gaebler. That tome 
promoted the concepts of competition rather than monopolies, results by funding 
outcomes rather than inputs, needs of the customer and not the bureaucracy, earning 
money and not spending it, decentralized authority, and solving social problems through 
market forces rather than creating new public programs (Hefetz & Warner, 2011; Lu 
2013; Zhang & Sun, 2012). In September 1993, NPR’s final report entitled, Creating a 
Government that Works Better and Costs Less, was issued and had over 1,250 action 
items covering reductions in the federal workforce, cutting internal regulations, requiring 
customer service standards, and streamlining headquarter operations.  
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Outsourcing government services continued to be promoted through the 
Republican Party’s platforms of 1992 and 1996 under the rubric of managing and 
streamlining government in the public interest (Aman & Greenhouse, 2016). Also, during 
the early to mid-1990s, many states and their court systems passed new laws to 
proactively support privatization efforts and minimize conflicts with existing state laws, 
civil service protections, procurement laws, and constitutional issues (Featherstun et al., 
2001).  
In March 1997, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) issued a report 
entitled, Privatization: Lessons Learned by State and Local Governments, for the House 
Republican Task Force on Privatization that compiled lessons learned by state and local 
governments on privatization matters. Those six major lessons learned were: 
(1) Political champions are needed to introduce and maintain privatization 
efforts and combat any resistance including from the government’s own 
workforce.  
(2) Establishment of new organizational structures are needed such as 
committed teams to identify and implement privatization opportunities. 
(3) Implementation of new legislative rules and/or reduction of government 
resources are needed to encourage privatization. 
(4) Reliable and actual cost data on all government activities are required to 
accurately establish a baseline cost to properly evaluate privatization 




(5) Workforce transitioning strategies are needed to assist government 
employees in transitioning to new private employers or transitioning out of 
government service through early retirement options or severance 
payments. 
(6) Effective monitoring and oversight of negotiated contracts are needed to 
ensure compliance with all contract terms to avoid ambiguities, 
misunderstandings, and disputes.  
During August 2001, President George W. Bush’s Management Agenda was 
launched as a strategy to improve the management and performance of the federal 
government. Bush’s Management Agenda had five government-wide initiatives including 
competitive sourcing. This initiative examined commercial activities performed by the 
federal government to determine if those activities should be provided by federal 
employees or outsourced to the private sector (The Federal Government is Results-
Oriented, 2004). In addition, state legislatures followed suit and reviewed their operations 
and assets to determine if outsourcing state services and programs to the private sector is 
feasible (Aman & Greenhouse, 2016).  
The International City/County Management Association (ICMA), the professional 
association for city and county managers and other employees that serve local 
governments, conducts many research projects for its 11,000 members including a survey 
of all counties and municipalities with a population of 2,500 or more across the United 
States regarding alternative service delivery (ASD). ICMA conducts these particular 
surveys every five years to keep track of alternative service delivery trends and has since 
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1982. The most recent ASD survey was conducted during June 2017 and offers a rich 
data set of how public managers view and conduct alternative service delivery.  
According to ICMA’s 2017 ASD survey that had a 17% response rate, 33% of 
local governments considered the feasibility of outsourcing services within the previous 
five years due primarily to internal attempts to decrease the cost of government and to 
respond to external fiscal pressures. About 24% of local governments took action to 
ensure success in implementing outsourcing activities primarily by identifying successful 
uses of outsourcing in other jurisdictions or hiring consultants to analyze the feasibility of 
alternative service delivery. About 20% of local governments encountered obstacles 
when they outsourced services including primarily opposition from line employees, 
elected officials, and citizens. Only 25% of local governments used systematic techniques 
to evaluate their outsourcing activities including field observations, establishing various 
performance standards, reviewing performance reports, conducting citizen surveys, 
monitoring citizen complaints, and regularly re-bidding service contracts. Only 14.3% of 
local governments insourced previously outsourced services due primarily to 
unsatisfactory service quality and insufficient cost savings.  
According to ICMA’s 2017 ASD survey, on average, 41% of services were 
provided in-house, 28% were outsourced to another government, 20% were outsourced to 
the private sector, and 11% were outsourced to non-profit organizations or volunteers. 
Local governments typically retain in-house street cleaning, snow plowing, traffic signal 
installation and maintenance, parking meter maintenance, street tree trimming, cemetery 
administration, code enforcement, parking lot/garage operations, water distribution and 
treatment, sewer collection and treatment, utility meter reading and billing, payroll, 
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public relations, crime prevention/patrol, fire suppression, emergency medical care and 
transport, parking enforcement, animal control, youth and senior recreation programming 
and operations, park landscaping/maintenance, convention center/auditorium operations, 
summer camps, library operations, comprehensive land use planning, economic 
development, land use review, and permitting. Operation/maintenance of bus or 
paratransit systems, airport operations, disposal of hazardous waste, public safety 
dispatch, prison/jail operations, sanitary inspections, insect/rodent control, animal shelter 
operations, and various welfare programs such as child welfare, elderly, nutrition, home 
healthcare, addiction treatment, mental health services, and workforce development were 
primarily outsourced to another government or authority. Residential and commercial 
solid waste collection, recycling, solid waste disposal, electric/gas utility operation and 
management, vehicle towing and storage, legal services, and operation of daycare 
facilities were primarily outsourced to the private sector. Homeless shelter operations, 
cultural and arts programs, and museum operations were primarily outsourced to non-
profit organizations or volunteers.  
Today, public managers are being asked to do more with less, steer rather than 
row, be entrepreneurs, and find new and innovative ways to achieve results. They have 
concentrated on accountability, high performance, restructuring the bureaucracy, 
redefining organizational missions, streamlining processes, and decentralizing decision 
making. In many cases, governments have succeeded in outsourcing previous 
government functions (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000). As Henry (2010) puts it, “We live in 
an era that is moving away from traditional government into a new trend of management 
across sectors. American governments are relinquishing, by design or default, their 
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traditional responsibilities and giving those responsibilities to individual citizens, groups 
of citizens, public-private partnerships, the non-profit sector, the private sector, public 
authorities, associations of governments, and other governments.” The outsourcing 
debate is about the quest for better functioning government, correcting inefficiencies by 
harnessing the strength of the private sector, maximizing returns on taxpayer investments, 
and enhancing citizen welfare and not a search for a better administration philosophy.  
For example, from 2000 to 2010, 37.6% of U.S. federal government spending was in the 
form of contracts and grants. In 2007, 45.5% of U.S. local government spending was in 
the form of outsourced contracts (Lu, 2013; Warner & Hefetz, 2008). Outsourcing all 
sorts of public services is now commonplace and routine on all levels of governments 
around the world (Lu, 2013; Wang, et al., 2018). More than a hundred countries have 
officially endorsed outsourcing and more are considering it (Kakabadses & Kakabadses, 
2001; Zhang & Sun, 2012).  
Government has the legitimate authority and fundamental responsibility to its 
citizens and society to ensure their safety through public sector values including 
accountability, transparency, and social justice. The private sector, on the other hand, is 
not bound to those values but instead respects efficiency, innovativeness, and profitability 
(Price & Morris, 2012). Outsourcing has many proponents and success stories but this 
type of public service delivery also has many opponents and failures.  
Opponents of Outsourcing Public Services 
Despite the popularity of outsourcing public services across the globe, 
disagreements remain whether outsourcing is beneficial and if this public service delivery 
method saves taxpayers money and accomplishes societal goals. Outsourcing opponents 
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argue that outsourcing adversely affects workers’ terms and conditions of employment, 
may lead to a reduction of service quality, and has challenges of merging the public 
organization’s values, missions, and incentives with that of the private organization. In 
addition, some public services are asset specific and require intensive capital 
infrastructure or complex such as water supply and judicial systems that are natural 
monopolies and not suitable to be outsourced to the private sector. Lastly, the benefits of 
outsourcing, including improvements of efficiency and service quality, are difficult to 
measure between the two sectors partly due to lack of data on public sector inputs and 
outputs (Feeney & Smith, 2008; Jenson & Stonecash, 2004; Poutvaara, 2014)   
Furthermore, many public managers are resistant to this alternative form of 
service delivery. According to a 2010 National Association of Counties (NACO) 
publication written by Michael Belarmino, public managers’ resistance to outsourcing 
stems from a multitude of causes including: 
• opposition from unsupportive elected officials and government employees 
who see outsourcing as a potential threat to their job security, working 
conditions, wages, and benefits.  
• loss of control, flexibility, and accountability of public service delivery. 
• unexpected cost increases from the private companies.  
• fear of a reduction of service quality.  
• difficulties with contract specifications, monitoring, evaluation, and 
incomplete contracts.  
• fear of making a wrong decision.  
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• not having enough local market competition that would produce the 
desired cost savings. 
• restrictive labor contracts.  
• previous negative experiences.  
In addition to the NACO study, many public managers believe that outsourcing public 
services to private companies, non-profit organizations, or other governmental entities is 
counterproductive and has many drawbacks. Those drawbacks include: 
• loss of institutional knowledge and skills in providing particular services.  
• loss of technology and R & D capabilities.  
• less operational flexibility to changing needs in a dynamic public 
environment.  
• lower operational effectiveness and coherence.  
• poor use of in-house staff, more demotivated staff, and greater number of 
staff reductions.  
• overdependence on a single vendor.  
• lost opportunities in terms of recognizing and dealing with organizational 
and community needs.  
• turning public managers into contract monitors.  
• greater distance between government and the governed (Belarmino, 2010; 
Kakabadses & Kakabadses, 2001; Lochlainn & Collins, 2015; Price & 
Morris, 2012; Tan & Sia, 2006).  
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As Malatesta and Smith (2014) further elaborated, outsourcing social services and 
those services deemed inherently governmental may lack the needed competition for 
effective marketplace governance. Long term outsourcing may impede the government’s 
ability to provide the services directly in the long run leaving services vulnerable to 
dependence. When that level of dependence is reached, the relationship between the 
government and its private sector or non-profit partners becomes more of an alliance 
where the government needs its contractor as much as the contractor needs the 
government. This type of situation leads to principal-agent conflicts.  
Principal-Agent Issues of Outsourcing Public Services 
As Brien and Hine (2015), Coupet and McWilliams (2017), Hwang (2014), Lane 
(2013), Lochlainn and Collins (2015), Price and Morris (2012), and Warner and Hefetz 
(2008) warned, outsourcing may lead to principal-agent conflicts between the owner of 
the asset (the principal or in this case the government) and the person, group, or 
organization to whom control of the asset has been delegated (the agent or in this case the 
private company, non-profit organization, or other level of government). The agent may 
act in a way contrary to the best interests of the principal such as self-serving 
opportunistic behavior that creates moral hazard or the agent may not possess the 
capabilities or talent needed to perform the required task that creates adverse selection. 
These types of conflicts are more likely to occur between profit-focused private 
companies and community-focused governments and less likely to occur between non-
profits and other levels of government that have the same focus. However, these conflicts 
can be minimized by negotiating and monitoring a comprehensive and well-crafted 
contract that allocates risks in an efficient manner between the parties, providing 
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incentives for performance, and including compliance benchmarks such as monitoring 
citizen complaints, conducting citizen satisfaction surveys, and auditing vendor 
performance. A well-crafted and monitored contract aligns the principal’s desire for 
efficient and effective service delivery with the agent’s objective to maximize long-term 
profits, market share, and stock prices (if a publicly traded company) that results in 
overall high performance. 
Results of Outsourcing Public Services – A Mixed Bag 
Outsourcing public services to the private sector and other organizations aims to 
achieve cost savings, but numerous academic studies have found a mixed bag of results 
including large and small cost savings, break even situations, and even cost increases but 
nothing conclusive. There is no rule of thumb on the expected magnitude of cost savings 
from outsourcing. Success or failure of outsourcing depends on the specific 
characteristics of each outsourced service such as suitability, administrative capacity, 
needed technical expertise, difficulty in preparing contract specifications and monitoring, 
and the competitive environment (Belarmino, 2010; Coupet & McWilliams, 2017; Jenson 
& Stonecash, 2004; Jenson & Stonecash, 2005; Lochlainn & Collins, 2015; Lu, 2013; 
Poutvaara, 2014; Warner & Hefetz, 2008; Zhang, et al., 2018). 
Outsourcing Public Services and Decision Making 
Government decisions are shared decisions. The bureaucratic patronage model of 
political decision-making sees government behaviors as a result of bargaining among 
various players in the government system. According to this model, government 
outsourcing decisions are not made solely by public managers themselves rationally but 
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are heavily influenced by different actors. Those actors within the government include 
public employees, elected officials, and the judiciary. Actors outside the government 
include citizens, vendors, and public employee unions. For example, when elected 
officials enact laws to restrict public spending and those laws are upheld by the judiciary, 
those actions lead to more outsourcing. Local governments that have an appointed 
manager also leads to more outsourcing. Higher levels of public employee unionization, 
however, lead to less outsourcing and more in-house service delivery. Therefore, when 
making outsourcing decisions, public managers have to assess and take into account 
many complex variables such as public service characteristics, legal framework of the 
organization, administrative capacity to design, implement, evaluate, and properly 
manage competitive contracts, local market conditions, citizen concerns and support, 
public employee unionization, interest group support, political pressure from elected 
supervisors, and the political continuum between liberalism that supports government 
involvement in social and economic affairs and conservatism that supports free markets 
including outsourcing and minimal government intervention. There is no one-size-fits-all 
approach to local government outsourcing. Context is crucial (Featherstun et al., 2001; 
Girth et al., 2012; Hefetz & Warner 2011; Lu 2013; Hefetz, Warner, Vigoda-Gadot, 
2015; Poutvaara, 2014).  
Outsourcing public services to the private sector and other organizations has been 
around for a long time, has its pros and cons, has traditionally consisted of only easy to 
measure support services but is increasingly being used for more complex core services, 
has global reaches, and remains an active part of the fabric of government service 
delivery (Price & Morris, 2012). Government managers, including this researcher, have 
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successfully outsourced a variety of public services and programs to the private sector 
and other levels of government for many years. Such services include human resource 
management, payroll services, information technology services, fuel management 
services, engineering services, legal services, employee medical claims payments, web 
design and hosting services, communication services, library operations, mental health 
and other social services, construction services, airport management, fleet maintenance, 
lawn care, landfill management, and senior citizen programs just to name a few. 
However, some government managers on the federal, state, and local levels, including 
this researcher, have also outsourced prison inmates.  
Outsourcing Government Inmates in Particular 
Prison facilities play crucial roles in all societies including protecting citizens 
from individuals that do not observe the formal rules of society, punishing criminals to 
discourage people from breaking the law, and providing conditions that make it possible 
for inmates to reenter society (Cabral & Saussier, 2013). As Mulch (2009) further 
explained, prisons exist for many reasons including deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation, 
incarceration, and restorative justice. Deterrence refers to the idea that members of the 
public can be deterred from committing crimes by being aware of and/or witnessing the 
condemnation and punishment of criminals. Retribution is the punishment of the 
perpetrator when the established rules, that have been enacted for law and order for the 
collective good, are violated. Rehabilitation is the traditional goal of prisons whereby 
inmates can be rehabilitated through a variety of rehabilitation programs and educational 
tools designed to provide assistance to remedy past problems for future success. 
Incarceration serves the public by removing dangerous individuals from the community 
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and isolating them from law-abiding citizens resulting in enhanced public safety. Instead 
of focusing on the perpetrator, a restorative justice approach seeks to mend the harm of 
criminal activity by elevating the roles of victims and victim advocacy and making the 
victims whole again.  
 For the reasons stated above, prisons have played and continue to play a vital role 
in any society. Prisons are needed to punish, rehabilitate, and incarcerate those who 
commit crimes and to separate those perpetrators from law abiding citizens. But what 
happens if a society and its government do not have the resources needed to construct or 
operate prisons to house individuals who break society’s rules? The government must 
therefore turn to others including private entities.    
Evolution of Outsourcing Government Inmates 
Outsourcing government inmates to private entities has had a long history and 
dates to the nation’s origins. Outsourcing of American prison labor began in 1790 when a 
jail in Philadelphia contracted out its prisoners to a private business for profit (Chang & 
Thompkins, 2002). In 1833, Alex de Tocqueville helped write a study entitled, On the 
Penitentiary System in the United States and its Application in France, where he noted 
that America has a penchant for inviting private profit-making into public prisons by 
allowing private contractors to use inmate labor (Requarth, 2019). By 1885, six systems 
of prisoner management were in place in the U.S.: (1) the contract system where private 
contractors furnished machinery and raw materials and supervised the inmates’ work 
under the watchful eyes of prison guards, (2) the piece-price system where contractors 
provided raw materials and paid the state for each piece made by inmates, (3) the convict 
lease system where inmate labor was outsourced to private entities for a fixed period and 
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fee and the private entities assumed entire control of the inmates including their labor, 
food, clothing, shelter, and discipline, (4) the state-account system where the state 
managed the inmates’ labor and production processes and sold the made products on the 
open market, (5) the state-use system where the state managed the inmates’ labor and 
production processes and sold the made products to other prison institutions or state 
agencies, and (6) the public works and ways system where inmates were used to 
construct public roads, railways, buildings, and other prisons as part of a public chain 
gang and later as part of a county work camp. These early prisoner management systems 
that relied heavily on private entities gradually faded away and were abolished. From 
about 1940 to the early1980s, only the state-use system and the public works and ways 
system were used (Chang & Thompkins, 2002; Friedmann, 2014; Joy, 2018). However, 
during this time, governments typically contracted with the private sector to provide a 
wide array of correctional support services such as healthcare, food service, education, 
vocational training, and inmate transportation but not to operate entire prisons (Gold, 
1996; Kim, 2019b).  
During the 1980s, Ronald Reagan’s presidential campaign included promises to 
shrink the size of government, reduce government personnel, and cut budget expenses. 
His campaign also created slogans such as “get tough on crime” and “get government off 
our backs, out of our pockets.” Once in office, President Reagan shifted government 
policies away from Keynesian economics that promoted social welfare policies and 
government intervention during economic struggles and toward a politically conservative 
neoliberal governance model that emphasized minimal government intervention in 
economic affairs, a commitment to privatization of government services, deregulation, 
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decentralization by pushing the provision of public services to lower levels of 
government, retrenchment through shedding of public services, individual responsibility, 
and a market-based state (Clark, 2016; Jing 2010; Kim, 2019b; Price & Morris, 2012; 
Schulz, 2015). The neoliberal governance model is based on Adam Smith’s 1776 book 
entitled, The Wealth of Nations, that argued laissez-faire capitalism is the ideal economic 
system because the market is self-regulated by an “invisible hand” and the government 
does not interfere. Under these conditions, the law of supply and demand, where 
individuals determine the levels of production and consumption, efficiently allocates 
society’s scarce resources, produces the best prices through market mechanisms rather 
through government regulations, and proficiently distributes goods and services that 
results in the greatest amount of economic progress. Neoliberalism holds that public 
organizations are inherently inefficient and less effective than the private sector and 
public services should be outsourced to the private sector in pursuit of profits (Price & 
Morris, 2012). 
In addition to a new governance model, the Reagan administration also ushered in 
new federal laws to combat the rising crime rates from the 1970s including the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 and the Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 and 
1988 that expanded the scope of criminalization, imposed minimum sentencing, 
increased penalties for drug related crimes, and required longer time served before parole 
and probation eligibility. These new federal laws followed by various state laws 
combined with detention of illegal immigrants, public resistance to expanding 
government budgets, taxpayer’s opposition to new taxes, citizen disapproval of bond 
issues for the construction of new prisons to match demand, and court degrees in an 
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attempt to reduce overcrowding in the interest of health and safety led to dramatic 
increases in the federal, state, and local prison populations to levels not seen before in 
modern times (Kish & Lipton, 2013). Government prison officials, without adequate 
resources such as inmate bed space, were forced to search the external environment to 
locate possible solutions to their problem. They found a viable solution in partnering and 
contracting with external organizations that possess the needed resources. This solution is 
predicted by RDT. Under these pressing conditions, inmate outsourcing took on a whole 
new meaning and beyond just outsourcing prison support services. For example, a private 
company can manage an entire existing publicly owned prison facility under a contractual 
arrangement or a private company can construct, own, and operate its own prison facility 
to house government inmates under a contractual arrangement (Kim, 2019b; Montes, 
2019; Price & Morris, 2012). Texas became the first state to adopt prison outsourcing 
legislation followed by the actual outsourcing of state inmates in Kentucky, Tennessee, 
and Florida during the mid-1980s (Jing, 2010; Mulch, 2009; Price & Riccucci, 2004).  
Outsourcing government inmates to the private sector continued to be popular. As Aman 
and Greenhouse (2016) indicated, President Reagan’s Executive Order 12607 in 
September 1987 supported prison privatization as an effective and appropriate tool for 
federal, state, and local governments to use. In 1992, President George H.W. Bush issued 
Executive Order 12803 mandating that all federal agencies encourage state and local 
governments to utilize private prisons to supplement public ones (Aman & Greenhouse, 





Pros and Cons of Outsourcing Government Inmates 
As Austin and Coventry (2001) and Gold (1996) pointed out, there are many 
reasons to outsource government inmates to the private sector and many reasons not to do 
so. The reasons to outsource inmates include: 
• Governments do not have the capability to house their inmates and 
therefore, private companies must provide financing options that allow 
government clients to pay for needed capacity. 
• Private companies can offer modern state-of-the-art correctional facility 
designs that are efficient and less costly to operate. 
• Private companies can design and construct a new correctional facility 
much faster and less expensive than government.  
• Private companies can provide the convenience and accountability for all 
facility compliance issues.  
• Private companies are able to respond rapidly and specialize in unique 
facility missions. 
• Private companies provide economic development opportunities to local 
communities such as hiring local people and purchasing local products. 
• Private companies can take on more share of liability issues and reduce the 
government’s exposure.  
• Private companies can have limited contract duration that increases the 
government’s flexibility.  




The reasons not to outsource inmates include: 
• Punishment of inmates is an inherent governmental activity and should not 
be outsourced to private actors. 
• There are only a few private companies that house government inmates for 
profit from which to select. 
• Private companies may be inexperienced regarding correctional issues.  
• Private companies may become oligarchical or monopolistic through 
political ingratiation or favoritism.  
• Governments may lose the capability to perform correctional services over 
time and become dependent on the private companies.  
• Private companies’ profit motives may inhibit the proper performance of 
duties which creates principal-agent, moral hazard, and adverse selection 
issues.  
• Government procurement and contract preparation are slow daunting tasks 
often resulting in incomplete contracts which hampers outsourcing 
effectiveness.  
The Private Sector Begins to House Government Inmates 
Private entrepreneurial companies including Core Civic, Inc. formerly known as 
Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), and the GEO Group, formerly known as 
Wackenhut Corrections Corporation, began to house federal and state inmates under 
contract for a fee for each inmate. These two private for-profit prison services 
corporations account for about 85% of the current private prison industry market. 
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According to their 2019 annual report, Core Civic was founded in 1983, is a publicly 
traded real estate investment trust (REIT) listed on the New York Stock Exchange, 
headquartered in Brentwood, Tennessee, operates three business segments (Safety, 
Community, and Properties), and had total annual revenue of $1.98B and net income of 
$189M during fiscal year ending December 31, 2019, an increase from the previous fiscal 
year. Core Civic’s Safety segment consists of 50 correctional and detention facilities 
owned, controlled, or managed by the company through long term leases with federal, 
state, and local government agencies with a total bed capacity of 73,000. This segment 
had a 93% average compensated occupancy rate excluding idled facilities and 85.2% of 
the company’s net operating income was realized from this segment during fiscal year 
ending December 31, 2019. Core Civic considers itself the nation’s largest owner of 
partnership correctional and detention facilities and is one of the largest prison operators 
in the nation. Core Civic’s Community segment consists of 29 residential re-entry centers 
owned, controlled, or managed by the company through long term leases. Approximately 
5% of the company’s net operating income was realized from this segment during fiscal 
year ending December 31, 2019. Core Civic’s Properties segment consists of 28 real 
estate properties owned by the company, leased to third parties, and used by various 
government agencies. Approximately 9.8% of the company’s net operating income was 
realized from this segment during fiscal year ending December 31, 2019. One of the 
company’s growing concerns is that the prison industry has dilapidated and outdated 
prison infrastructure posing operational risks.  
According to their 2019 annual report, the Geo Group was founded in 1984, is a 
publicly traded real estate investment trust (REIT) listed on the New York Stock 
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Exchange, headquartered in Boca Raton, Florida, operates three business segments (U.S. 
Secure Services, Geo Care, and International Services) and had total annual revenue of 
$2.48B and net income of $166M during fiscal year ending December 31, 2019, an 
increase from the previous fiscal year. The U.S. Secure Services segment consists of 67 
secure facilities owned, controlled, or managed by the company through long term leases 
with federal, state, and local government agencies with a bed capacity of 75,173. This 
segment had a 95% average compensated occupancy rate excluding idled facilities and 
65% of the company’s revenue was realized from this segment during fiscal year ending 
December 31, 2019. The GeoCare segment consists of 45 residential re-entry centers with 
10,952 beds and 68 non-residential centers owned, controlled, or managed by the 
company through long term leases. Approximately 25% of the company’s revenue was 
realized from this segment during fiscal year ending December 31, 2019. The 
International segment consists of six secure facilities with 7,664 beds located in the 
United Kingdom, Australia, and South Africa. Approximately 10% of the company’s 
revenue was realized from this segment during fiscal year ending December 31, 2019.  
Social justice activists have been waging a bitter campaign against these two 
titans of the prison industry for profiteering from recent immigration policies that 
incarcerated more people. This politically motivated campaign drove Wall Street, large 
banks, and investors to bow down to public pressure, abandon the private prison industry, 
and cut off access to capital resulting in lower stock prices and depressed credit ratings 
for the two companies. If investors continue to make financial decisions based on social 
issues, Core Civic and the Geo Group could face difficulty acquiring loans in the future 
preventing them from growing and satisfying a public need (Merle & Jan, 2019).  
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These two private for-profit prison services corporations and the prisons they own 
and operate and the public prisons they manage under contracts are subject to strict rules 
and regulations, closely monitored by government inspectors to ensure contract 
provisions are met, and receive a negotiated daily fee per inmate from the state. Inmates 
housed in these prisons are classified as minimum or medium security that do not have 
medical, psychological, or mental health issues and who will create the least amount of 
trouble. The violent maximum-security inmates and inmates with medical issues remain 
in the state prison systems (Aman & Greenhouse, 2016; Kish & Lipton, 2013; Montes, 
2019). Private for-profit prison services corporations see themselves as government 
agents operating within the framework of the justice system and structuring inmate 
behavior until they reenter society (Kyle, 2013). 
These private for-profit publicly traded prison services corporations have 
fiduciary responsibilities to their shareholders to make a profit, preserve their reputations, 
keep their stock price high, continue to increase their market share, and maintain access 
to capital to remain a viable going concern. These responsibilities motivate them to 
provide effective and high-quality services and rapidly correct poor performance in order 
to get their contracts renewed, maintain their legitimacy, and not lose clients. Otherwise, 
these corporations would have fewer resources or commodities (i.e. human inmates) 
which would lead to lower profits and stock prices, unhappy stockholders, difficulty in 
accessing capital, and perhaps a collapse of the private for-profit prison business model. 
The same motivations and consequences do not exist in the public sector (Gold, 1996; 
Kim, 2019b; Mulch, 2009).  
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To meet their responsibilities and accomplish their goals, these private for-profit 
prison services corporations must operate efficiently, reduce costs, and increase revenues. 
To reduce costs, private prison corporations typically provide minimal staffing and 
training, low wages, few benefits, no overtime, minimal employee and inmate health 
care, few rehabilitation programs, and have a large span of control while avoiding 
expensive unionization. These cost reduction approaches may negatively affect officer 
and inmate safety, heighten employee turnover, escalate violence and lawsuits, decrease 
the overall quality of both the prison and the prison staff, boost escapes, and increase 
recidivism. To increase revenues, private for-profit prison services corporations usually 
charge excessive fees for inmate telephone, email, and video visitation usage, 
commissary items, and other inmate services. But to dramatically increase revenues, the 
number of inmates incarcerated in their facilities as well as their length of sentences and 
recidivism rates must increase as well (Appleman, 2018; Chang & Thompkins, 2002; 
Joy, 2018; Kim, 2019b; Mulch, 2009; Price & Morris, 2012).  
Private for-profit prison services corporations have no incentives to deter criminal 
behavior or support government legislation or programs that focus on deterrence, 
alternative sentencing, or rehabilitation. These private corporations have amassed a large 
supply of political capital and influence to keep a constant supply of inmates flowing into 
their facilities to remain in business, maintain profitability, and ensure government 
dependence. This sizable political capital and influence comes from lobbying and 
maintaining close relationships with elected officials and other decision makers, 
contributing to political campaigns of elected officials, offering lucrative jobs to former 
public officials, and actively supporting “think tank” policy initiatives that promote 
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increased incarceration policies. Through political capital and influence, the private 
corporations actually lobby for longer sentences, stricter sentencing guidelines, limited 
parole and probation, and new sets of laws such as anti-immigration laws that create 
more imprisonment. The aspiration of the private for-profit prison services corporations 
to increase imprisonment and longer sentences are inconsistent and diametrically opposed 
to rational public policy, prison quality, and societal goals of prisoner rehabilitation. 
These aspirations have actually thwarted criminal justice reforms that would have 
reduced the prison population and the overall cost of the criminal justice system 
(Anderson, 2009; Antonuccio, 2008; Appleman, 2018; Bryant, 2020; Chang & 
Thompkins, 2002; Friedmann, 2014; Khey, 2016; Kim, 2019b; Mulch, 2009; Price & 
Morris, 2012). As Montes (2019) commented, private for-profit prison services 
corporations’ duty is to their shareholders and to prioritize efforts to generate money.  
The government’s duty is to the people and priorities that align with societal correctional 
goals. These two duties are very different things and create a catch-22 situation.  
Results of Outsourcing Government Inmates – A Mixed Bag 
The overarching assumption about outsourcing government inmates is that the 
private sector can operate existing public prisons or construct and operate new private 
prisons more efficiently and at less cost than government due to market competition. 
However, the literature indicates that outsourcing government inmates to the private 
sector contains mixed results as to whether this practice achieves cost savings 
(Appleman, 2018; Austin & Coventry, 2001; Clark, 2016; Freidmann, 2014; Joy, 2018; 
Kim, 2019b; Price & Morris, 2012; Requarth, 2019; Wright, 2010). Some studies show 
that outsourcing inmates leads to significant cost savings because private firms have a 
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profit motive with a goal of maximizing shareholders’ wealth. Specifically, these studies 
indicated that private companies can construct and operate prison facilities more 
efficiently and inexpensively than government. Regarding construction, private 
companies are not bogged down in strict draconian purchasing rules that dominate 
government construction practices, can acquire funding quicker, and can build new 
facilities at a significant discount and in a shorter period of time. Regarding operations, 
private firms are free from bureaucratic red tape and entrenched restrictive work practices 
that government is known for and have the ability to use technology, innovative 
practices, and new incarceration philosophies that result in reduced operational costs 
(Aman & Greenhouse, 2016; Antonuccio, 2018; Austin & Coventry, 2001; Coupet & 
McWilliams, 2017; Glushgo, 2016; Jing, 2010; Johnson, 2006; Khey, 2016; Price & 
Riccucci, 2004). 
Conversely, other reports including one from the federal General Accounting 
Office, now known as the Government Accountability Office (GAO), reviewed five 
studies on the subject in 1996 and concluded multiple times that the data are not 
sufficient to definitively claim that either type of prison is more cost effective 
(Friedmann, 2014; Mumford, et al., 2016). The University of Utah’s Criminal Justice 
Center also reviewed 12 different studies and formulated that outsourcing inmates to the 
private sector had no clear benefit or detriment and the cost savings appear minimal 
(Lundahl et al., 2009). Kish and Lipton (2013) listed and summarized 20 different studies 
from 1989 to 2010 that compared public and private prison costs. Seven studies indicated 
definite cost savings and 13 studies were inconclusive. 
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Still, other studies argue that evaluating cost savings from outsourcing 
government inmates to private prisons is very difficult to measure and compare with any 
precision due to the myriad of differences in inmate populations, housing types, levels of 
security, staffing size, types of programming, accounting methods, rural or urban 
locations, age and size of the prison, lack of data from private prison corporations due to 
proprietary information, and definition of services (Friedmann, 2014; Gold, 1996; 
Harding, 2001; Kim, 2019b; Kish & Lipton, 2013). In addition, Kish and Lipton (2013) 
and Wright (2010) indicated if public and private facilities are not evenly matched, any 
findings are challenging to interpret and their conclusions and implications are suspect at 
best. Friedmann (2014) and Kish and Lipton (2013) also indicated that very little of the 
research comparing the costs of public and private prison is peer-reviewed and frequently 
funded by the private prison industry itself which tends to cast doubt on its conclusions.  
Lastly, governments can directly affect the profitability and survivability of 
private prison firms by restraining their profit-maximizing behavior by means of 
threatening funding reductions or policy shocks through its contracts. Governments can 
increase private prison costs by requiring certain investments and establishing minimum 
standards to improve quality and meet expected social goals thereby erasing cost savings 
resulting in similar cost as the government (Kish & Lipton, 2013).  
Beyond the possible benefits of cost savings, there are always political, social, 
and legal factors that come into play when deciding to outsource government inmates to 
the private sector. Private prisons provide tangible benefits including reducing state and 
federal prison overcrowding, being a predictable cost through a negotiated daily fee per 
inmate, having scalability for future use, transferring liability to the private sector, and 
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providing a positive nonpolluting recession-proof economic benefit to the community 
where private prisons are built through job creation, property tax generation, and 
consumption of local products and services. Notwithstanding the facts presented and the 
arguments made about outsourcing, government leaders continue to argue that 
outsourcing services to the private sector is the most efficient way to deliver public 
services and keep government small (Ayres, 2019; Fulcher, 2012; Johnson, 2006).  
Opponents of Outsourcing Government Inmates 
Opponents of outsourcing government inmates to the private sector have many 
arguments to vocalize. Those arguments include private prisons are strictly about profits 
for themselves and their stockholders rather than rehabilitation or reform for inmates and 
society which lowers prison quality and standards. Opponents vehemently argue that 
prison operations and housing inmates are inherently governmental functions and 
coercive punishment should be performed by the government, “the people,” through the 
local community and not outsourced to the private sector. When offenders are punished 
by private actors unconnected to the local community, that punishment lessens the 
expressive message and social condemnation normally sent by the community thereby 
weakening the authority of the state and diminishing the integrity of the criminal justice 
system (Appleman, 2018; Clark, 2016). In that vein, at least four states including Nevada, 
Illinois, New York, and California have passed legislation that banned private prisons and 
22 other states have enacted laws and policies that do not allow them to house inmates in 
private prisons (Kim, 2019a). Opponents also argue that private companies could 
abruptly increase their fees to the state at contract renegotiation time or go bankrupt if 
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they did not earn enough profit thereby leaving the government in an unfavorable 
financial and resource situation.  
In addition, private prison guards do not enjoy qualified immunity like their 
public counterparts leaving private prisons and their employees more susceptible to 
lawsuits and higher damage awards. Qualified immunity protects public prison guards 
and their ability to perform their jobs without threat of litigation (Johnson, 2006; Kish & 
Lipton, 2013; Montes, 2019). In the 1997 U.S. Supreme Court case, Richardson v. 
McKnight, Price and Morris (2012) explained the court ruled that private sector 
employees could not invoke qualified immunity even though they were under contract 
and serving on behalf of the government. During 2016, the Obama administration 
attempted to gradually end private prison contracts with the federal government due to 
safety and cost effectiveness concerns as compared to public facilities but the Trump 
administration reversed that policy during early 2017 (Appleman, 2018; Joy, 2018; Kim, 
2019b). However, the Biden administration reversed the Trump era policy and reinstated 
the Obama era policy during January 2021 as part of the Biden administration’s racial 
justice initiatives (McFadden, 2021). Lastly, opponents argue that prison privatization 
leads to oligopoly or monopoly since most of the prison contracts are held by only two 
large corporations, Core Civic and the GEO Group (Kish & Lipton, 2013; Mulch, 2009; 
Thomhave, 2019).  
Today, the private prison industry is very active and will continue to play a major 
role within the criminal justice system (Mulch, 2009). There are about 116,000 people 
incarcerated in over 270 private prison facilities operating in 31 U.S. states particularly in 
the conservative and non-union southern and western states (Chang & Thompkins, 2002; 
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Muhitch & Ghandnoosh, 2021; Price & Riccucci, 2004). But private prisons are only a 
small part of the overall prison system and hold less of a tenth of the 2.3M people 
incarcerated in the U.S. (Price & Morris, 2012; Requarth, 2019).  
Chapter Summary 
The literature review chapter covered three topics that were intertwined with the 
research questions. Those topics were resource dependence theory, outsourcing public 
services in general, and outsourcing government inmates in particular. Resource 
dependence theory (RDT) and the strategic actions managers can take to reduce and 
manage their resource dependence was the overall framework applied to this research 
project. In addition to strategic managerial actions, issues and concerns about RDT as 
they relate to the difficulty of managing external organizational relationships with power 
imbalances and information distortion were uncovered as well as how this organizational 
theory applied specifically to the Georgia prison system, its lack of inmate bed space, and 
the need to rely on and contract with external organizations such as county governments 
and private for-profit prison services corporations for needed resources. As a strategic  
managerial action of RDT, outsourcing public services in general was discussed along 
with how this alternative method of public service delivery has evolved, opponents and 
resistance to outsourcing, principal-agent conflicts that may arise by using this method of 
service delivery, how studies have found outsourcing public services to the private sector 
and other levels of government to be a mixed bag of results with nothing conclusive to 
determine if this method of service delivery saves money, and what factors decision 
makers consider when reaching outsourcing decisions. After obtaining a clear view of 
how outsourcing public services work in general, this alternative method of service 
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delivery was applied to inmate incarceration, how outsourcing of government inmates 
evolved, and the pros and cons of outsourcing government inmates to the private sector. 
Furthermore, the two largest private for-profit prison services corporations, Core Civic 
and the GeoGroup, how they operate, and their motivations were explored along with 
how studies have found outsourcing government inmates to the private sector to be a 
mixed bag of results with nothing conclusive to determine if this method of incarceration 




















In the private sector, operational success is known based on profit and loss 
statements, market share, and stock prices which are easily determined through 
corporations’ annual reports. Private sector managers want to increase their financial 
traits to keep their businesses surviving and thriving. If private corporations do not make 
a profit, there is no reason for them to remain in business. The two private for-profit 
prison services corporations, for example, Core Civic and the Geo Group dominate their 
industry’s market, had high positive incomes during the most recent completed fiscal 
year of December 31, 2019, and will continue their profitable operations and business 
model of incarcerating government inmates.  
On the other hand, the public sector has no profit or loss statements, market share, 
or stock prices and operational success is difficult to determine as compared to their 
private-sector counterparts. If governmental entities do not generate enough revenue and 
need additional funding, elected officials can simply impose tax rate and user fee 
increases or cut expenses and remain a monopolistic power. Housing outsourced state 
inmates in county correctional institutions is not a core function of Georgia county 
governments and is optional. County governments do not have the same financial 
pressures that private for-profit prison services corporations have and are not accustomed 
to acting like a private business with profit and loss motives or business continuity 
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concerns. But Georgia county governments are providing a vital service needed in the 
marketplace. However, county governments that house state inmates can easily abandon 
this optional service to the state and continue their core local government functions if 
needed and without issue.  
The general research questions become: Are the optional 21 Georgia county 
correctional institutions financially successful? Are their revenues more than their 
expenses? What benefits do optional correctional institutions bring to host counties? Are 
operating optional correctional institutions worth the effort for the host counties or are the 
host counties just providing a service to the state to the detriment of the county and its 
finances? How much money does the state save by outsourcing inmates to counties? The 
specific research questions are reiterated as: 
• Q1: how are the host Georgia county governments impacted in the areas of 
finances, use of inmates, service provision, and avoidance of future cost 
by operating optional county correctional institutions?  
• Q2: how much is the magnitude of the financial benefit or lack of financial 
benefit to the host Georgia counties that operate optional county 
correctional institutions?  
• Q3: how much does the state of Georgia and its prison system financially 
benefit by outsourcing state inmates to county correctional institutions? 
Research Approach and Design 
This research project explored the census of the 21 Georgia county correctional 
institutions to understand them in greater detail, determine if their operations were 
financially successful, educate decision makers and the public about this obscure and 
66 
 
unique method of incarceration, and perhaps develop a theory regarding operating these 
types of facilities. Using an in-depth exploratory framework, this project leaned toward a 
qualitative research approach and used a multiple case study research design. As a 
background, qualitative research explores a topic in great detail to gain an in-depth 
understanding of the topic, identifies factors that cannot be easily measured, and collects 
an extensive amount of data from a variety of sources to answer “how” and “why” 
research questions using words and narratives (Creswell, 2013, 2014). The case study 
research design is a specific type of research design that studies a program, event, 
activity, process, organization, or individual that is unique, has unusual interest, and 
needs to be described or understood within a real-life setting bounded by certain 
parameters such as time and place. Case studies collect extensive amounts of data from a 
variety of sources such as documents, interviews, observations, and audiovisual materials 
over a long period of time and the researcher then develops an in-depth understanding of 
the program, event, or activity using rich descriptions culminating in a composite picture 
about the overall meaning of the case, lessons learned, analytic generalizations, and 
maybe even a theory from studying the case (Creswell, 2013; Yin, 2014). A multiple case 
design is considered more effective, compelling, and robust than a single case study 
because it enables the collection of comparative data that are likely to yield more accurate 
and generalizable theory than a single case (Yin, 2014). 
The cases and units of analysis for this research project were the census of the 21 
county correctional institutions that are geographically dispersed throughout Georgia 
and bounded by their most recently completed financial audits for FYE  
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2017, 2018, and 2019. Three fiscal years of data were selected to obtain an average to 
smooth out any anomalies that may be present in any one year.  
Role of the Researcher 
For this research project, the researcher is a highly experienced local government 
manager that has over 34 years of experience managing all aspects of suburban and rural 
city and county government operations in Texas, Florida, and Georgia. That experience 
includes preparing and monitoring annual budgets, assisting with annual audits, 
supervising a variety of department heads and employees, continuously improving 
government operations, and finding new ways to make local government more efficient 
and cost less such as outsourcing appropriate public services to the private sector and 
other levels of government. Of those 34 years of experience, over 25 years were 
managing six suburban or rural Georgia county governments of which only one county 
(the current county) operates an optional correctional institution. Since October 2016, the 
researcher has been the county manager of a rural Georgia county that operates one of the 
21 optional county correctional institutions as a typical county department. The 
researcher hired the current county warden during 2017 to manage the facility. During 
that time, the researcher allocated funding through the annual budget process to operate 
the correctional institution, made various facility improvements, and marketed the facility 
to increase the number of outside contracted inmate work details with nearby city and 
county governments as a way to generate additional revenue.  
The researcher has amassed an in-depth understanding of just one county 
correctional institution and its operations but remains interested in further understanding 
this particular public service in greater detail. Specifically, how were Georgia 
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correctional institutions initially formed? Why would a county government want to 
operate an optional service on behalf of the state? What are the benefits for the state and 
the host county of operating this type of facility? Do the 21 county correctional 
institutions make a profit, endure a loss, or just break even? Do the elected and appointed 
officials of the 21 county governments truly know the financial impacts these facilities 
have on their county governments? What would happen if these facilities closed? Once 
these questions are answered and documented, all interested Georgia county government 
officials will be able to know if operating optional county correctional institutions are 
worth the effort for host counties or are host counties just providing an optional service to 
the state to the detriment of the county and its finances? If the research results prove 
positive, the researcher can then advance this information to decision makers in other 
Georgia counties that do not operate county correctional institutions and correctional 
officials in other states that do not have this type of inmate housing model so they can 
decide if they want to begin a similar program to benefit their counties or states 
especially during the current era of civil unrest, unstable national politics, decreasing tax 
revenues, lack of an available workforce, and high labor costs. 
The researcher is a long-term Georgia county manager and personally knows 
many other county managers in the state. This professional relationship helped provide 
access to needed documents, the 21 county correctional institutions, and their county 
wardens. In addition, the researcher has an excellent professional relationship with the 
local county warden who helped review this project and acted as an emissary to the other 




Data Collection Method 
The qualitative research approach and the case study research design, by 
definition, collect an extensive amount of data from a variety of different sources 
including documents, interviews, observations, and audiovisual materials. To capture the 
data needed for this research project, the researcher collected, reviewed, and analyzed 
numerous public documents regarding Georgia counties and their correctional 
institutions. Those documents included 2019 U.S. Census Bureau demographic data, 
Georgia Department of Corrections (GDOC) facility information, website content from 
host counties regarding their correctional institutions, and three years of audited revenue 
and expense data from host counties, county capacity agreements between GDOC and 
host counties, local internal institutional reports called Comparable Statistics (CompStat) 
Reports required by GDOC to obtain utilization rates, number of work details, number of 
inmates per work detail for each facility, unemployment rate data from the Federal 
Reserve Economic Data, and property tax data from the Georgia Department of Revenue. 
The three years of collected data spanned from 2017, 2018, and 2019 and were used to 
calculate three-year averages of the above information to smooth out any anomalies that 
may be present in any one year.  
In addition to reviewing various public documents, telephone interviews were 
conducted with each county warden and finance officials using an original interview 
questionnaire that doubled as the data recording instrument. Follow-up telephone calls 
and emails were also used to obtain additional details and clarify collected information to 
obtain a richer, deeper, consistent, and more accurate understanding of the correctional 
institutions and their operations. Due to the current COVID-19 global pandemic, personal 
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interactions or visits to the correctional institutions were not possible. Since the census of 
the 21 county correctional institutions was studied, sampling procedures were not 
applicable. Personal telephone interviews, using an original interview questionnaire that 
doubled as the recording instrument, were selected as the optimal research design method 
to achieve a high response rate and obtain complete, accurate, and consistent data from 
all county wardens as opposed to an impersonal emailed digital survey for the wardens to 
understand and complete on their own and maybe return.  
Data Recording 
To record the extensive amount of data that was collected from various public 
documents, telephone interviews, and follow-up telephone calls and emails, the 
researcher carefully prepared a comprehensive original interview questionnaire that also 
doubled as the data recording instrument to organize the data. The original data recording 
instrument consisted of closed-ended questions that were answered by the collected 
public documents and opened-ended questions that were answered by the telephone 
interviews and follow-up telephone calls and emails.  
The original data recording instrument was organized into five sections including 
Community Characteristics, Institutional Information, Financial Information, Other 
Information, and Observations/Notes. The Community Characteristics section contained 
closed-ended demographic type questions such as county location, population attributes, 
ethnicity, per capita income, median household income, poverty rate, average property 
tax rate, and average unemployment rate to gain a detailed demographic perspective of 
each county. The Institutional Information section consisted of closed-ended and open-
ended questions about the correctional institutions themselves and their wardens such as 
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who hires the county warden, experience and current salary of the appointed warden, 
institutional housing style, age and security level of the institution, outsourced services, 
programs offered to inmates, facility capacity, utilization rate, use of inmates, and how 
many full-time and part-time employees it takes to operate each correctional institution. 
The Financial Information section consisted of closed-ended and open-ended questions 
about the host county’s fiscal year, where the correctional institution is placed in the 
county’s budget, what the county warden thinks about the correctional institution’s 
financial performance, audited revenues and expenditures of the facility resulting in a 
profit or loss amount, cost avoidance of not having to hire county employees or 
contractors to perform the work inmates perform, profit or loss amount when cost 
avoidance is factored in, and the cost savings the state receives from outsourcing state 
inmates to less expensive county facilities. The Other Information section consisted of 
open-ended questions about the origin of the institution, future plans for expansion or 
closure, how working inmates are viewed and perceived by county citizens and 
employees, biggest problems and challenges operating the correctional institution, and 
future need of additional county correctional institutions. The last section entitled, 
Observations/Notes, recorded the researcher’s observations or thoughts using handwritten 
notes regarding the telephone interviews.  
The data recording instrument was developed, refined, and pilot tested for quality 
control and logic purposes with the experienced county warden managing the 
researcher’s county correctional institution. Her comments were incorporated into the 
final instrument. The final data recording instrument is included in the research paper as 
Appendix D. Data collected from the public documents to answer the closed-ended 
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questions were inserted into the data recording instrument prior to the actual telephone 
interviews.  
Data Analysis 
Making sense of an extensive amount of collected and recorded data, which is 
indicative of qualitative and case study research, involves a linear hierarchical approach 
beginning with specific individual data and building toward more general manageable 
patterns and themes (Creswell, 2013, 2014). For this research project, the researcher 
followed the data analysis steps as described by Creswell (2013, 2014). In general, the 
researcher managed all collected specific individual data by placing the data in the 
appropriate sections on the data recording instrument as previously described. Once all 
sections were completed, the researcher placed the raw data in Excel spreadsheets and 
calculated ranges, averages, and percentages. Based on this format, the researcher began 
to interpret the raw data to make sense of the data section by section and began to build 
explanations from general patterns and themes to broader and more abstract meanings 
culminating with asking the ultimate questions: What were the lessons learned? How do 
the findings align with or differ from the larger research literature that was developed by 
others? Do the findings answer the research questions? What generalizations can be made 
and what theory can be developed based on the findings?  
Verification of Validity and Reliability of the Findings 
Once the data was collected, recorded, and analyzed, the findings were verified 
for validity and reliability to answer the ultimate question: Did the researcher get it right? 
For this research project, the researcher used triangulation, member checking, peer 
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debriefing, and thick and rich descriptions as ways to validate the research findings 
(Creswell, 2013, 2014). For triangulation, the researcher used an extensive amount of 
data collected from multiple sources such as public documents, telephone interviews, 
follow-up telephone calls and emails, and observations/notes to point to common themes. 
For member checking, the researcher submitted the relevant portions of the completed 
data recording instrument to the county wardens and finance officials to receive their 
feedback regarding the documents’ accuracy and credibility. For peer review/debriefing, 
the researcher had the highly experienced local county warden, who manages the county 
correctional institution in the county the researcher serves as county manager, read the 
final report, ask questions, and make comments to ensure the report was accurate, 
understandable, and rational to the targeted readers. The researcher used thick and rich 
descriptions to convey the research findings, presented analytical generalizations, and 
developed a theory. Lastly, the researcher documented all research steps, procedures, and 
data recording instruments used so that other researchers can reliably follow and replicate 
this case study. 
Ethical Considerations 
Qualitative research and the case study research design, by definition, interact 
with individual participants. Therefore, ethical considerations were anticipated during all 
phases of this research project to minimize harm to them. This research project was a 
major academic research undertaking and involved interactions with many participants 
including Georgia county managers, Georgia county wardens, Georgia county finance 
officials, and officials at the Georgia Department of Corrections through telephone 
interviews and follow-up telephone calls and emails. This project was also subject to 
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Institutional Review Board (IRB) scrutiny and approval. See Appendix E for the IRB 
Exemption Form.  
After the IRB approved the research methods and prior to collecting the original 
research data through telephone interviews with county wardens, the researcher had the 
local warden call each of the other 20 county wardens informing them of this research 
project, requesting their assistance, and suggesting a time and date for a telephone 
interview with the researcher. Once assistance was agreed upon, the researcher emailed 
each of the wardens the interview questionnaire and a cover memo with the required 
informed consent language as stated in the IRB approval form. The cover memo stated 
the title and purpose of the study, the researcher’s name, risks involved, estimated time 
commitment to complete the telephone interview, participation was voluntary, responses 
would not be associated with any identities, participation in the telephone interview 
would serve as the voluntary agreement to participate, where questions or concerns could 
be directed, and the study had been approved by the university’s IRB. The cover memo 
also confirmed the established times and dates of the actual telephone interviews. See 
Appendix F for the Informed Consent Statement. The researcher also notified the 
participants that they would receive a copy of their particular correctional institutions’ 
evaluation and a copy of the final report as measures of reciprocity. While collecting the 
data, the researcher was aware of the participant’s time commitment to the project and 
protected the privacy of the participants by not collecting harmful or inappropriate 
information. During data analysis, the researcher disclosed the full range of findings 
including those that may be contrary to the original themes and literature, respected the 
privacy and the anonymity of the participants by masking names and sites, and avoided 
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disclosing only positive or expected results. During reporting, the researcher provided 
accurate information and findings/conclusions, communicated in a clear straightforward 
unbiased language, and shared data. After the project is completed, the researcher will 
keep and store the completed paper recording instruments and all supporting documents 
in paper folders in a locked file cabinet in the possession of the researcher for at least 
three years in accordance with the IRB approval form.  
Limitations 
The researcher identified four limitations of this research project. The first 
limitation included the low level of understanding county managers and county wardens 
have of the overall impact their county correctional institutions have on their county and 
its finances which may affect their ability to properly answer the questions during the 
telephone interviews. The second limitation is the different ways county managers and 
county wardens organize their county correctional institutions’ departmental budgets and 
whether they include all revenues and expenses associated with their department which 
can make comparisons among counties rather difficult. The third limitation is the lack of 
detail the counties’ independent financial auditors provide in their annual audit 
documents regarding the correctional institutions which can make comparison among 
counties somewhat challenging. The fourth limitation is that this research project is not 
an exhaustive traditional cost-benefit analysis where all conceivable costs are calculated 






This research project of exploring the census of the 21 Georgia county 
correctional institutions in depth, attempting to understand them in greater detail, 
determining if their operations are financially successful, and educating the public of this 
obscure and unique method of incarceration leaned toward a qualitative research 
approach and a multiple case study research design. Based on these selections, specific 
research steps associated with the multiple case study design were used. The role of the 
researcher and his interest in the research project were clearly evident. An extensive 
amount of data was collected from public documents, telephone interviews, and follow-
up telephone calls and emails. The data that was collected was recorded on an original 
recording instrument that received quality control and logic testing. The data was placed 
on Excel spreadsheets to calculate ranges, averages, and percentages and analyzed 
according to Creswell’s (2013, 2014) data analysis steps beginning with specific 
individual raw data and building toward more general patterns and themes. These general 
themes allowed the researcher to compare the 21 county correctional institutions to each 
other to offer analytic generalizations and develop a theory that readers can learn from, 
transfer to their communities, and possibly implement. The findings were verified for 
validity using triangulation, member checking, peer debriefing, and thick and rich 
descriptions. The findings were written and presented as a major research project using 
the APA citation and style format and the case study writing structure. Ethical 
considerations were anticipated and implemented during all phases of the research project 
to ensure the participants would not be harmed and the completed recording instruments 
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and all supporting documents will be kept for at least three years in a secure environment. 
























This chapter reviews the findings that resulted from analyzing the collected data 
about Georgia county correctional institutions to understand this local option method of 
incarceration in greater detail, determine if their operations were financially successful, 
educate decision makers and the public about this obscure and unique method of 
incarceration, and perhaps develop a theory regarding operating these types of facilities. 
The ultimate goal was to answer the central research question of “How does operating 
optional county correctional institutions impact the host county government and their 
operations.” To shed light on how these facilities operate and answer the research 
questions, this chapter includes comparative summary information about the 
demographic characteristics of the counties that host correctional institutions, institutional 
management and facility attributes, use of inmates, and financial performance of the 
correctional institutions using narratives and descriptive statistics such as ranges, 
averages, and percentages.  
The participation rate of the 21 county correctional institutions and their wardens 
was 100%.  However, the financial data from the Gwinnett County correctional 
institution was eliminated from the study because that correctional institution houses 
many county inmates in addition to state inmates which significantly increased its overall 
labor and operational costs and those costs were not delineated between county cost and 
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state cost, making comparisons with other correctional institutions very difficult. In 
addition, many county wardens referred the researcher to their county’s finance 
departments for the needed financial data. One county’s finance department did not 
respond to repeated requests for the financial data. Therefore, all subsequent sections of 
this chapter contain data from all 21 county correctional institutions except for the 
financial performance section. That section only contains data from 19 of the 21 facilities 
(90%).  
Demographic Characteristics of Counties that Host Correctional Institutions 
Of Georgia’s 159 counties, only 21 (13.2%) of the counties operate optional 
county correctional institutions. The 21 county correctional institutions are dispersed 
throughout the state and located in both rural and urban counties. For this study, rural 
means a 2019 population of 50,000 or less and urban means a 2019 population of 50,000 
or more. Of the 21 counties, 62% were urban and 38% were rural. Terrell County, located 
in the southern part of the state, had the smallest population of only 8,531 residents and 
Gwinnett County, located in the metro Atlanta area, had the largest population of 936,250 
residents. The average population of all 21 counties was 133,649 residents. The 
population of each county hosting a correctional institution has been increasing and 
decreasing. Terrell County experienced a population decline of -10.3% from 2010 to 
2019 while Effingham County saw a population increase of 23% during the same time 
period. The average population change of all 21 counties was 5.2% from 2010 to 2019 
while the state’s population change was 9.6% during the same time period (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2020b).  
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The 21counties that host correctional institutions had a racial composition of an 
average of 61% white and 34% black, virtually mirroring the state’s percentages of 60% 
white and 33% black. The county with a majority white population was Jackson County 
located in the northern part of the state with 88% white and the county with a majority 
black population was Clayton County located in the southern metro Atlanta area with 
73% black (U.S. Census Bureau, 2020b).   
The wealth of each county was analyzed using 2019 per capita income, median 
household income, and poverty rates. Regarding per capita income, Mitchell County, 
located in southern part of the state, had the lowest per capita income of $17,514 and 
Harris County, located in the western mid-section of the state, had the highest per capita 
income of $34,511. The average per capita income of all 21 counties was $23,855 while 
the state’s per capita income was $29,523. Regarding median household income, 
Jefferson County, located in the eastern mid-section of the state, had the lowest median 
household income of $34,300 and Harris County had the highest median household 
income of $74,261. The median household income among the 21 counties averaged 
$47,961 while the state’s median household income was $55,679. Effingham County was 
the most affluent county hosting a county correctional institution with a poverty rate of 
only 8.3%. The least affluent county was Mitchell County with a poverty rate of 29.3%.  
The average poverty rate among the 21 counties was 19.1%, well above the state’s rate of 
13.3% (U.S. Census Bureau, 2020b).  
The property tax burden was also analyzed for each of the counties that hosted 
optional county correctional institutions. The unincorporated property tax rate was 
averaged for tax years 2017, 2018, and 2019 and resulted in an overall average rate of 
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13.977 mills. Carroll County, located in the western part of the state, had the lowest 
average unincorporated property tax rate of 8.161 mills and Clayton County had the 
highest average unincorporated property tax rate of 20.863 mills (Georgia Dept. of 
Revenue, 2020).  
The unemployment rate for each of the 21 counties was also averaged for 2017, 
2018, and 2019 and resulted in an overall average rate of 4.88%. Jackson County had the 
lowest average unemployment rate of 3.33% and Terrell County had the highest average 
unemployment rate of 6.83%. The state’s unemployment rate averaged 3.97% (Federal 
Reserve Economic Data, 2020).  
Lastly, of the 21 counties that host and operate county correctional institutions, 19 
counties (90%) had county managers/administrators managing daily operations and only 
two counties (10%) did not. Those two counties without county managers/administrators 
were Decatur County and Carroll County.  
From the demographic information presented, it appears that counties that host 
and operate optional correctional institutions are mostly urban, have an increasing 
population, predominately white, have lower average per capita incomes and lower 
median household incomes as compared to the state, have higher average poverty rates 
and higher average unemployment rates as compared to the state, and have a county 
manager/administrator at the helm managing this important public resource with 
assistance from a county warden. See Appendix G for the demographic characteristics of 




Correctional Institutions’ Wardens 
The county correctional institutions are managed by local county wardens that are 
full-time county employees hired by a local authority such as the county 
manager/administrator or an elected Board of Commissioners or a combination thereof 
and affirmed by the Board of the Georgia Department of Corrections (GDOC). 
According to O.C.G.A. §§ 42-5-30, the local wardens serve at the pleasure of the county 
and GDOC, must meet certain qualifications as established by GDOC, take an oath of 
office to faithfully discharge their duties in accordance with GDOC rules, execute a bond 
of not less than $10,000 payable to the Governor to faithfully account for funds and 
property in the wardens’ care, have no interest in or profit from the labor of inmates or 
receive gratuities, and submit monthly inmate reports to GDOC. The local wardens and 
their deputized subordinates also have arrest powers to arrest persons that violate 
established facility guard lines by bringing weapons, drugs, or alcohol near the facility, 
exchanging articles with inmates such as weapons, alcohol, drugs, telephones or tobacco, 
loitering near inmates, or using unmanned aircraft to photograph the facility for purposes 
of committing a criminal offense. In addition, the GDOC Commissioner may confer all 
powers of a police officer upon a local warden as the Commissioner deems necessary if 
the warden meets the requirements to be a police officer. 
According to the research, the 21 county wardens are hired in a variety of ways 
including by the county manager/administrator (33%), or by the elected Board of 
Commissioners or chairman (43%), or by a recommendation from the county 
manager/administrator to the Board of Commissioners and the Board makes the final 
hiring decision (24%). The 21 county wardens have substantial experience in being 
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wardens. The average number of years of experience serving as the warden in their 
current facility is 8.5 years. About 43% of the county wardens had previous careers with 
GDOC in various capacities including serving as state prison wardens before retiring and 
becoming county wardens. The other 57% of the county wardens, without a GDOC 
background, served in other capacities including as deputy wardens or correctional 
officers in their current facilities, within Sheriff’s Offices, within city police departments, 
with other state agencies, and with other correctional institutions. The wardens’ current 
annual salaries ranged from $52,000 to $192,000 with the average being $91,755 and the 
median being $85,650 when outliers were taken into consideration. However, it should                                                                                         
be noted that the few wardens with higher salaries were assigned additional county 
departments or had other county inmate programs to manage in addition to their 
correctional institution duties. Those additional county departments included a 
combination of departments that heavily use inmates including the animal shelter, road 
department, fleet management, building maintenance, code enforcement, and solid waste.  
See Appendix H for the correctional institutions’ warden data set.  
Facility Attributes 
Of the 21 county correctional institutions located throughout the state, the oldest 
ones are located in Effingham County and Jefferson County. Both of these facilities have 
been continuously operational since 1925 and are 96 years old. The newest one is located 
in Gwinnett County, having opened during 2002 and is only 19 years old. The average 
age of all county correctional institutions is 56 years. All the county correctional 
institutions were constructed and are currently operating with an open dormitory concept 
whereby inmates are housed in large single rooms in bunkbeds, which is the least 
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expensive inmate housing type, as opposed to two and four person cells (Georgia 
Department of Corrections, County Prisons, 2019). The current average GDOC 
contracted bed capacity of all 21county correctional institutions totaled about 4,800 beds. 
Athens/Clarke County, a consolidated government and home of the University of 
Georgia, had the smallest average contracted bed capacity at 131 while 
Columbus/Muscogee County, another consolidated government and the third largest city 
in the state, had the largest average contracted bed capacity at 528. The average 
contracted bed capacity among all 21 county institutions was 228. During the data 
collection period of FYE 2017, 2018, and 2019, seven of the 21 county correctional 
institutions (33%) increased their contracted inmate bed capacity between five and 64 
inmates (County Capacity Agreements, 2020).  
Six of the 21 county correctional institutions (29%) offered a work release 
program known as transition centers. These transition centers are located within or very 
near the correctional institution, house eligible state inmates, and these inmates are 
included in the contracted bed capacity amount. However, these inmates go to work at 
regular jobs in the community during the day, are paid competitive wages for their labor, 
and return to the facility at night unlike regular inmates that are assigned work details and 
not paid for their labor. The inmates in the transition centers reimburse the county facility 
for their room and board, pay accrued fines, and furnish restitution. Interestingly, only 
one county pays certain inmates for their labor as a long-standing practice. Those inmates 




As authorized by O.C.G.A. §42-5-53, county correctional institutions can house 
county sentenced inmates in addition to state sentenced inmates. Of the 21 county 
correctional institutions, only six facilities (29%) house county inmates. Most wardens 
attempt to keep the number of county inmates sentenced to their correctional institution 
by local judges to a minimum and do not like to mix county inmates with state inmates 
due to intricate state laws that pertain to the correctional institutions and state inmates but 
not to county inmates.  
The 21 county correctional institutions are heavily used and relied on by the state 
as seen from their utilization rates. During the data collection period of FYE 2017, 2018, 
and 2019, the average utilization rate for all facilities ranged from 93% to 101% 
culminating in an average overall utilization rate of 97% (County Prison Compstat 
Reports, 2020).  
Operating any correctional facility is a labor-intensive endeavor and county 
correctional institutions are no exception. The county correctional institutions rely 
primarily on full-time labor and part-time positions are not significantly used. The 
budgeted full-time positions ranged from a low of 14 positions to oversee a contracted 
bed capacity of 140 in one correctional institution to a high of 117 positions to oversee a 
contracted bed capacity of 528 in another correctional institution. The average number of 
budgeted full-time employees for the 20 correctional institutions overall was 47 positions. 
This positional analysis excluded the Gwinnett County correctional institution since it 
manages many county programs and has many more employees making comparisons 
difficult.   
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Instead of having full-time employees perform certain tasks, all 21 county 
correctional institutions except one outsourced certain inmate services to private 
companies to perform. Those outsourced services typically include the inmate telephone 
system, inmate medical services, inmate commissary services, and inmate food services.  
The wardens were also asked additional questions regarding their facilities 
including their biggest operational challenges, programs offered to inmates, and future 
planning. The biggest challenges that were discussed were organized into three 
categories: internal organizational issues, inmate issues, and GDOC issues. Internal 
organizational issues included recruitment and retainage of qualified staff members, high 
employee turnover, low employee pay, lack of budget resources, improper employee 
supervision of inmates, high vehicle and equipment repair cost due to mistreatment by 
inmates, dealing with old infrastructure and building code issues, maintaining aged 
equipment, high building maintenance costs, no room for expansion, and lack of 
understanding, support, and recognition from local elected officials of the work the 
correctional institution performs and the revenues generated from outside contracted 
work details. Inmate issues included gang activity, lack of inmate skills and work 
experience, and inmate acquisition of contraband. GDOC issues included dealing with 
the GDOC bureaucracy, overly burdensome state required paperwork, too many state 
policies and procedures to follow, GDOC does not recognize county needs, the $22 per 
day per inmate reimbursement rate paid by the state to host counties is insufficient, the 
need for the state to reimburse counties for inmate legal expenses such as habeas corpus 
cases, and lack of state lobbying efforts on behalf of county correctional institutions.  
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Regarding the challenge of too many GDOC policies to follow, there are several 
state laws that pertain to county correctional institutions that could be construed to be 
excessive. Those state laws include O.C.G.A. §42-5-40 that states wardens who cause 
any inmate to do any work on Sunday, except works of necessity, shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor. O.C.G.A. §42-5-60.1 states inmates shall not work on outdoor assignments 
in inclement weather as defined by rain or temperatures below 28 degrees unless 
government employees are also working in that same outdoor environment performing 
similar work. O.C.G.A. §42-5-30 states correctional officers shall not be known or 
designated as guards or prison guards. O.C.G.A. §42-5-38 states that any person that 
makes a false statement of their age to obtain employment as a correctional officer or 
warden shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Lastly, O.C.G.A. §42-5-39 states if a warden 
refuses to accept an inmate shall be punished by confinement not exceeding ten years and 
dismissed from office.   
In the area of inmate programs, wardens of county correctional institutions are 
required by O.C.G.A. §42-5-57 to give inmates reasonable educational, religious, and 
recreational activities where practicable. Therefore, all 21county correctional institutions 
offered these types of programs but some wardens went above and beyond. The most 
typical programs offered among the facilities included a combination of GED courses, 
Motivation for Change (substance abuse intervention program), Thinking for Change 
(cognitive behavioral change program), Moral Reconation Therapy (cognitive behavioral 
treatment program), Re-entry skills (life management program covering money 
management, work ethics, housing, etc.), Alcoholics Anonymous, Narcotics Anonymous, 
Matrix (substance abuse and relapse prevention program), Detour (substance abuse 
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program), general recreation, and general worship services. The county correctional 
institutions also offered a variety of on-the-job training skills and certificate programs in 
the areas of welding, plumbing, HVAC, construction zone flagging, animal care, 
chainsaw safety, paint and body work, heavy equipment operations, firefighting, forklift 
operations, and even beekeeping.  
Some county wardens went above and beyond other wardens and offered more 
programs and services to the inmates. Four correctional institutions operated inmate fire 
stations whereby inmates are certified firefighters and respond to fire calls in all areas of 
the community on a 24/7 basis. Two wardens offered unique programs with catchy names 
that provided intensive job skills training, essential life skills, educational upgrades, and 
employment to specific eligible inmates from the local area prior to their release to 
facilitate their re-entry into society.  
Regarding future planning, 18 of the 21 wardens (86%) have no plans for 
expansion while three wardens (14%) have plans to expand their facilities especially in 
the area of transition centers. One county even asked local voters to replace their current 
correctional institution that was constructed in the mid-1960s with a new $11M facility 
using Special Purpose Local Option Sales Tax (SPLOST) proceeds as the funding 
mechanism. That SPLOST referendum, which included many other projects, was 
approved during March 2021. None of the 21 wardens have plans for closure. When 
asked about the need for any additional correctional institutions in the future, 17 wardens 
(81%) leaned toward yes while only four wardens (19%) indicated no additional facilities 
are needed. The reasons for additional correctional institutions were organized into three 
categories: ways correctional institutions benefit the counties, ways correctional 
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institutions benefit the inmates, and a possible hybrid model of future county correctional 
institutions based on the transition center standard. See Appendix I for the facility 
attributes data set.  
Correctional institutions provide the counties that host and operate them with 
positive economic benefits by providing a supplemental unpaid inmate labor force to 
perform local public works projects, having the counties avoid the cost of not having to 
hire additional county employees or contractors to perform the work inmates perform, 
and giving the counties the ability to outsource state inmates to neighboring cities, 
counties, and state agencies to generate additional revenue for the host counties.  
Counties that do not operate local correctional institutions could benefit from them if they 
have the ability to afford and manage one. GDOC can even assist counties financially in 
constructing or expanding a correctional institution as authorized by O.C.G.A. §42-2-13.  
On the inmate side, county correctional institutions benefit the inmates by 
offering GED courses and other educational opportunities in small personal settings 
which is conducive to developing better work ethics and job skills. The small personal 
settings with one-on-one attention better prepare inmates to return to society and be 
successful versus large state prisons and their impersonal surroundings.  
Some county wardens believe current state judicial reforms do not work, there 
will always be offenders that break the law and need to be incarcerated, which will lead 
to a higher prison population in the future. Their solution is to revamp and expand the 
transition center model of incarceration. County correctional institutions were originally 
designed to warehouse inmates and are not conducive to influencing inmates to become 
better versions of themselves. Transition centers would offer more educational programs, 
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vocational training, treatment, and counseling than traditional county correctional 
institutions and inmates would work at local jobs in the community, earn competitive 
wages, reimburse the center for their room and board, and pay off their fines and 
restitution. Having more of these centers would benefit the inmates and allow them to 
easily reenter society as productive citizens. These wardens further elaborated and 
suggested that a future hybrid model of county correctional institutions be created by 
housing both state and county inmates together in one facility that leans more toward 
transition centers to keep the work details at full strength, provide local businesses with a 
workforce, provide more sentencing options for judges, and not rely solely on GDOC for 
state inmates and their daily fee per inmate revenue. Moving toward this hybrid model of 
incarceration, several wardens believe, would lead to reduced recidivism.  
The wardens that indicated additional correctional institutions are not needed in 
the future provided thoughtful insights. Those insights included that the state prison 
population is decreasing and will continue to decrease in the future due to the creation 
and continuation of state managed non-residential accountability courts and restorative 
justice programs such as drug courts, mental health courts, DUI courts, and parental 
courts that emphasize education, treatment, and counseling for non-violent offenders. 
These courts and programs divert non-violent offenders that are suitable to be assigned to 
county correctional institutions to non-residential programs leaving only violent and 
hardcore offenders in the state prison system that are not suitable to be assigned to county 
correctional institutions. In the future, the use of prisons will be the last resort due to the 
high cost of operating them. These wardens also believe new county correctional 
institutions are too expensive to construct and are not a good fit for many counties 
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especially those located in the urban metro areas even though these facilities benefit the 
counties economically. The existing 21 county correctional institutions could handle 
future inmate increases in the event the prison population expands due to new sentencing 
guideline or an increase in crime.  
Use of Inmates 
County correctional institutions are work camps where state inmates act as a 
supplemental unpaid labor force to perform public works projects for host counties. 
According to the research, county wardens classify each inmate as they arrive in the 
facility and assign them to one of three types of work details based on their previous 
criminal history and personal attributes. The three work details consisted of outside 
contracted work details, outside non-contracted work details, and inside work details. 
According to O.C.G.A. §42-5-60, under no circumstances shall inmates be hired out to 
private persons or companies to work for profit.  
Of the 21 county correctional institutions, 90% of the wardens used outside 
contracted work details to assist other nearby local governments and state agencies with 
their public work through fee-for-service contracts. But the wardens used these types of 
work details rather sparingly. During the data collection period of FYE 2017, 2018, and 
2019, four correctional institutions had an average of only one outside contracted work 
detail and the facility with the most outside contracted work details had an average of 12. 
The average number of outside contracted work details for all correctional institutions 
overall was four and the median was two. The average number of inmates per detail for 
all facilities was seven (County Prison Compstat Reports, 2020). 
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More specifically, inmates assigned to outside contracted work details travel from 
the correctional institution to other nearby local governments and state agencies such as 
the Georgia Department of Transportation and community colleges during the workweek 
typically from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. The fee-for-service contracts typically reimburse the host 
county for the cost of the salary and benefits of the supervising correctional officer and 
sometime include a daily rate for each inmate. The local government or state agency that 
use a work detail must typically provide transportation and all work tools. These fee-for- 
service contracts also generate additional revenue for host counties. 
All 21 county correctional institutions used outside non-contracted work details to 
perform a wide variety of public work for many county departments and state agencies 
during the work week from generally 7:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. The inmates are transported 
from the correctional institutions to public work sites by county-owned trucks, vans, and 
small buses and supervised by county correctional officers or trained county employees. 
During the data collection period of FYE 2017, 2018, and 2019, the correctional 
institution with the least amount of outside non-contracted work details had an average of 
13 and the correctional institution with the most outside non-contracted work details had 
an average of 79. The average number of work details of all facilities overall was 33 and 
the median was 28. The average number of inmates per detail was four (County Prison 
Compstat Reports, 2020). 
More specifically, inmates assigned to outside non-contracted work details work 
within the host county and are assigned to various county departments and local state 
agencies to perform public work. Those county departments were typically Public Works 
Departments to mow grass on public rights-of-way and in cemeteries, pick up roadway 
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litter, and install road signs, Parks and Recreation Departments to mow athletic fields, 
stripe game fields, and clean concession stands, Fire Departments to clean fire stations, 
mow grass, and act as volunteer firefighters, Animal Shelters to keep the shelters clean, 
Facilities Maintenance Departments to repair, paint, and provide janitorial and mowing 
services to public buildings, Fleet Maintenance Departments to repair public vehicles and 
equipment, Solid Waste Departments to collect residential garbage on a curbside basis 
and sort recyclable materials, and Airports to mow grass and keep the facilities clean.  
The inmates also work at other county departments such as courthouse and administration 
buildings, 911 Centers, Health Departments, Libraries, Senior Citizens Centers, Water 
and Sewer Departments, and Board of Education offices to clean and maintain the 
facilities, mow grass, and provide janitorial services. Inmates assigned to outside non-
contracted work details also work at the local offices of the Georgia State Patrol, Georgia 
Forestry Commission, Georgia Department of Natural Resources, and Georgia 
Department of Motor Vehicles to mow grass and maintain those facilities. One county 
even has inmates operate a sawmill and used the end products as building materials on 
public projects. Interestingly, in more counties than not, inmates were allowed to drive 
county vehicles, heavy equipment, and light equipment if they possess the proper 
licenses.  
Inmates assigned to inside work details work within the county correctional 
institution itself and perform needed internal work such as cleaning, preparing and 
serving food, performing laundry duties, barbering, and maintaining the facility and its 
vehicles and equipment. During the data collection period of FYE 2017, 2018, and 2019, 
three correctional institutions had an average of four inside work details and the 
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correctional institution with the most inside work details had an average of 20. The 
average number of inside work details for all facilities was nine and the median was 
seven. The average number of inmates per detail for all facilities was five (County Prison 
Compstat Reports, 2020). See Appendix J for the use of inmates data set.  
Inmates performing work for host counties on any of the work details were 
viewed in a positive and favorable light by county employees and the public according to 
all wardens. According to the wardens, citizens and employees see the inmates’ work as 
valuable, essential to the workings of county government, and saving the county money 
by using inmate labor rather than county employees or contractors. Everyone was used to 
seeing the inmates, accustomed to their daily routine, and considered inmates to be a part 
of the family and treated as such. Inmates seem to fade in the background and do not 
garner much attention from employees or citizens. Some wardens try to keep their 
correctional institutions and the inmates invisible to the public and “below the radar” 
while other wardens want to bring attention to the inmates and showcase their work by 
promoting them through positive public relation campaigns such as publishing newspaper 
articles with photos and offering tours of the correctional institution to nearby college 
students studying criminal justice programs.  
Financial Performance 
Georgia county correctional institutions are optional for counties to operate. An 
astute county official would think these optional institutions generate positive economic 
benefits for the county. Otherwise, the county is just providing a service for the state at 
the detriment to the host county and its finances. To determine if these facilities generate 
a positive economic benefit for host counties, audited revenues and expenses were 
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collected and analyzed from each of the 21 correctional institutions for FYE 2017, 2018, 
and 2019. Two counties (10%) were omitted from the study; one for not responding to 
repeated requests for needed financial information and the other for operating a 
correctional institution that housed many county inmates which resulted in more 
personnel and operational costs making comparisons with the other correctional 
institutions difficult.  
The remaining 19 counties (90%) accounted for their correctional institutions’ 
financial data in numerous ways in their annual budgets. Twelve counties (63%) placed 
their correctional institutions’ financial data solely in the General Fund. Six counties 
(32%) placed their correctional institutions’ financial data in the General Fund and in at 
least one Special Revenue Fund. One county (5%) placed their correctional institution’s 
financial data in an Enterprise Fund and a Special Revenue Fund. As a high-level 
overview of fund accounting, the type of accounting used by all local governments, the 
General Fund is the major fund used by local governments to account for all financial 
transactions of a general nature which are not accounted for in other funds. The General 
Fund’s typical revenue sources include an assortment of property taxes, sales taxes, 
motor vehicle taxes, building permits, intergovernmental grants, charges for services, 
court fines, investment income, and other financing sources. Typical departments funded 
by the General Fund include well known departments such as Public Works, Parks and 
Recreation, Sheriff’s Office, Jail, Judicial Courts, Library, and the County Correctional 
Institution. Special Revenue Funds are funds used to account for all financial resources 
that are legally or administratively restricted for special purposes. For example, counties 
collect 911 telephone surcharges placed on users’ monthly telephone bills and legally 
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restrict those funds to be used only for 911 and emergency communication purposes. In 
the case of correctional institutions, some counties use Special Revenue Funds to collect 
funds from inmates when they purchase products from the inmate commissary store and 
restrict that revenue and profits to be used only for inmate needs. Enterprise Funds are 
used to account for all county operations that are financed and operated in the same 
manner as private enterprises, on a self-supporting basis. Enterprise Funds of local 
government typically consist of utility type operations such as Water and Sewer 
Departments and Solid Waste Departments that collect user fees as opposed to taxes and 
use those fees to operate that department without the expectation of needing other 
unrelated outside funds.  
Regardless of where the correctional institutions’ financial data was placed in the 
budget and the number of funds used, the audited revenues and expenses for each county 
correctional institution were similar to each other. Audited revenues for each correctional 
institution consisted of a combination of the daily fee per inmate received from the state 
($20 per day per inmate), revenues from outside contracted work details, reimbursements 
from transition center inmates, inmate telephone commissions, inmate commissary 
commissions, inmate medical reimbursements, sick call fees, dismissal fees, disciplinary 
fees, and inmate account management fees. Audited expenses for each correctional 
institution consisted of a combination of salary and benefits of the correctional 
institutions’ employees, purchased/contract services, and supplies. Capital expense items 
were omitted from this analysis due to their annual volatility. The audited revenues and 
expenses from FYE 2017, 2018, and 2019 were analyzed for all 19 correctional 
institutions and averaged. The average audited revenues ranged from $1,181,000 to 
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$4,773,246 with average revenues of all 19 correctional institutions being $2,145,343.  
The average audited expenses ranged from $1,261,984 to $8,535,609 with average 
expenses of all 19 correctional institutions being $3,541,249. When the audited revenues 
and expenses of the 19 correctional institutions were compared, all facilities except one 
had major annual financial losses. The profit and loss amount ranged from ($4,497,994) 
to $32,872 with the average loss for all correctional institutions being ($1,395,906). The 
correctional institution that was established as an Enterprise Fund was the only 
correctional institution to generate a small profit.  
So why would a county government want to operate an optional correctional 
institution if it did not generate a positive economic benefit? The main reason for 
counties to operate these facilities is to obtain a supplemental unpaid inmate labor force 
to perform public works projects in an effort to save money. However, the analysis is not 
complete until the cost avoidance is calculated and factored in of not having to hire 
county employees or contractors to perform the work inmates perform. For this analysis, 
the number of inmates assigned to outside non-contracted work details (i.e. inmates that 
work in the various county departments) were used but reduced by a factor of 25% to 
account for travel time to and from the work site, not working a full eight-hour day, and 
lack of job skills, motivation, and interest that a full-time county employee should 
possess. The resulting number represented the number of full-time employees or 
contractors the county would need to hire to replace the inmates. The number of new full-
time employees that would be needed was multiplied by $50,000 per employee ($15 per 
hour pay rate plus employee benefits consisting of health insurance, FICA, Medicare, 
retirement, unemployment, and workers’ compensation) to arrive at a cost avoidance 
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amount. The average cost avoidance for all counties ranged from $2,587,500 to 
$10,350,000 with the average cost avoidance for all 19 counties being $4,683,553. When 
the cost avoidance amount was added to the average profit or loss of each correctional 
institution, all correctional institutions (100%) enjoyed a significant annual profit instead 
of a significant annual loss. The average profit/cost avoidance for all counties ranged 
from $466,287 to $6,286,897 with the average profit/cost avoidance for all 19 counties 
being $3,287,647. 
The host counties were not the only entities that experienced positive financial 
benefits. By outsourcing state inmates to less expensive county correctional institutions, 
the state saved a significant amount of taxpayer money. According to a 2018 Georgia 
Department of Audits and Accounts report, to house an inmate in a state prison costs 
$44.56 per day when controlling for offender sex, facility size, and facility risk 
classification. By outsourcing a state inmate to a county correctional institution, the state 
saved $44.56 per day but paid the host county only $20 per day as a daily rate, saving 
$24.56 per day per inmate. For the data collection period of FYE 2017, 2018, and 2019, 
the average annual savings to the state was $38,633,576. See Appendix K for the 
correctional institutions’ financial performance data set.  
Summary of Findings as  
Compared to the Research Questions and Literature Review 
 
The central research question was, “How does operating optional county 
correctional institutions impact the hosting Georgia county governments and their 
operations?” The specific research questions included: 
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• Q1: how are the host Georgia county governments impacted in the areas of 
finances, use of inmates, service provision, and avoidance of future cost 
by operating optional county correctional institutions? 
• Q2: how much is the magnitude of the financial benefit or lack of financial 
benefit to the host Georgia counties that operate optional county 
correctional institutions?  
• Q3: how much does the state of Georgia and its prison system financially 
benefit by outsourcing state inmates to county correctional institutions? 
The findings conclusively answered the posed research questions. Q1: all 21 
counties that hosted optional correctional institutions received significant financial 
benefits by having a supplemental unpaid inmate labor force perform a variety of needed 
public work. As the research indicated, the inmates housed in county correctional 
institutions were assigned to 1) outside contracted details that performed work for nearby 
local governments and state agencies through fee-for-service contracts that generated 
revenue for the host counties, 2) outside non-contracted details that performed work in 
various county departments such as mowing grass, picking up litter, providing janitorial 
services to public facilities, repairing public vehicles and equipment, performing minor 
building repairs, and fighting community fires, and 3) inside details that performed 
internal work such as cleaning the facility, preparing and serving food, performing 
laundry duties, and barbering. These unpaid inmates provided a wide variety of needed 
public services that would have otherwise not been accomplished or performed by county 
employees receiving salary and benefits or contractors receiving contract fees and those 
costs were avoided and will continue to be avoided in the future.  
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Q2: as the research further demonstrated, operating county correctional 
institutions cost money that is extracted from taxpayers and impacted the county’s 
budget. When audited revenues were compared to audited expenses over the three-year 
period, all but one of the 19 correctional institutions experienced significant financial 
losses. That is how some members of the public, elected officials, and even county 
wardens and county managers view the operations of these facilities, as a loss if they 
thought about it at all. However, when cost avoidance is factored in of not having to pay 
salary and benefits to county employees or contract fees to contractors to perform the 
work inmates perform in the various county departments, the significant financial losses 
turn into significant financial profits/cost avoidance for each facility. The resulting 
magnitude of the annual financial benefit averaged $3,287,647 among all 19 facilities.  
Q3: the state of Georgia outsourced an average of 4,825 of its excess state inmates 
to less expensive county correctional institutions over the three-year period. By 
outsourcing those inmates to county governments, the state saved $44.56 per inmate per 
day but paid the counties $20 per inmate per day. The resulting annual savings to the 
state averaged $38,633,576. 
The literature review indicated that outsourcing public services in general was a 
mixed bag of results as it relates to cost savings, inconclusive, and dependent on specific 
characteristics of each outsourced service. No one size fits all. The literature review also 
indicated that outsourcing government inmates in particular was a mixed bag of results as 
it relates to cost savings, inconclusive, and comparisons between public and private 
facilities were very difficult to make due to differences in inmate population, housing 
types, levels of security, staffing size, types of programming, accounting methods, rural 
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or urban locations, age and size of the prison, lack of data from private prison 
corporations, and definition of services. To accurately compare facilities, they have to be 
somewhat equally matched.  
With this research project, the 21 county correctional institutions were very 
similar to each other and rather homogeneous. They were all small and older facilities, 
used an open dormitory housing style, managed by experienced wardens, had the same 
type of inmate population, outsourced similar services, offered similar inmate programs, 
had the same structure of inmate work details, and had similar sources of revenues and 
types of expenses. The high level of similarity, homogeneity, and county warden 
participation rate made comparisons among the county correctional institutions more 
accurate and generalizable.       
Generalization of Results and Theory Development  
Since this research project received a 100% participation rate from the 21 county 
wardens and 90% of the financial data was received, generalizations of the research 
results are appropriate. To apply this new knowledge, the averages mentioned in this 
research project were used to show readers how a new correctional institution could be 
established that would generate similar financial benefits. Table 1 represents a 
generalization of revenues, expenses, the resulting direct profit or loss, cost avoidance of 
not having to hire full-time county employees or contractors to perform the work that 
inmates perform, a revised profit or loss when cost avoidance is factored in, and savings 
to the state for outsourcing state inmates to less expensive county correctional 
institutions.   
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The analysis resulted in the correctional institution having a direct loss of $1,169,040 but 
when the cost avoidance amount of $4,950,000 was factored in, the county enjoyed a 
$3,780,960 annual profit/cost avoidance and the state enjoyed an annual savings of 
$1,819,802.  
Table 1: New County Correctional Institution Generalization 
 
Potential Revenue Sources Estimated Revenue 
Daily fee from the state  
(228 inmates x 97% capacity x $22 per day x 365 days per year) 
 
$1,775,915 
Revenues from other entities 
(4 outside contracted work details x $40,000 per detail per year) 




Commissary commissions (outsourced) 80,000 
Telephone commissions (outsourced) 50,000 
Reimbursements-medical and release expenses  9,000 
Total Direct Revenues $2,147,715 
 
Anticipated Expense Types Estimated Expenses 
Salary and benefits 
(40 FT employees x $60,000 (average annual salary & benefits) + warden’s 





(Repairs/maintenance for departmental equipment and vehicles, 





(General office/janitorial supplies, utilities, vehicle gasoline/tires, inmate 




Total Direct Expenditures $3,316,755 
 
Direct Profit or (Loss) ($1,169,040) 
 
Cost Avoidance of Not Having to Hire Full-Time County Employees or Contractors 
Avg. # of inmates performing outside non-contracted work x 0.75% x 
$50,000 salary and benefits of a new entry-level full-time county employee. 




Total Cost Avoidance $4,950,000 
 
Profit or (Loss) When Cost Avoidance is Factored In $3,780,960 
 
Potential Annual Cost Savings to State Due to Outsourcing State Inmates to County 
$44.56 per inmate per day state cost less $22 per inmate per day the state 
pays counties x avg. number of inmates held in CI x 365 days per year. 
($44.56 - $22 x 221 x 365) 
 
Total Annual Cost Savings to the State $1,819,802 
Source: Dowling and Nelson, 2021 
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In addition to the operating cost of a new correctional institution, the physical 
facility needs to be addressed. A new 228-bed county correctional institution would need 
291 square feet per bed or 66,348 square feet of gross square footage. Assuming the new 
correctional institution is an existing county-owned facility on county-owned land that is 
renovated for correctional institution purposes using an open dormitory concept as 
opposed to more expensive new construction and land acquisition, the cost per square 
foot to renovate is estimated to be $250 per square foot. The total cost of the renovated 
space would be $16,587,000. This cost includes inmate intake area, disciplinary cells, 
small medical clinic, adequate program space, staff offices, laundry room, kitchen 
facilities, secure general storage, and video arraignment for court hearings. When design 
and consultant fees and furniture, fixtures, and equipment (FFE) are added at 18%, the 
final cost increases $2,985,660 to $19,572,660. However, with an annual profit/cost 
avoidance of $4,950,000, the return on investment would be about six to seven years 
when existing county employees are shed over time through attrition and future operating 
cost increases are factored in (L. Latimer, personal communication, 2020).  
 Based on the research findings and the above generalization, a theory has been 
developed regarding optional county correctional institutions. That theory states, if a 
Georgia county hosts and operates an optional correctional institution based on the model 
presented in this research study, it will receive significant financial benefits and the state 
will save a significant amount of taxpayer funds. This theory can also be expanded by 
indicating that if other states adopt this model of county operated correctional institutions 
to house state inmates that Georgia uses, they and their local governments will reap 




After the data was collected, recorded, and analyzed for this research project, 
findings could then be presented. In this chapter, the demographic characteristics of the 
counties that host optional correctional institutions were presented. The management of 
the correctional institutions was presented including how wardens are hired, their 
authority, job requirements, years of experience, previous backgrounds, and average 
salary amounts. Facility attributes were listed including age, housing style, contracted bed 
capacity, which facilities operate transition centers as part of the correctional institution, 
housing of county inmates, utilization rates, full and part-time positions needed to operate 
the facilities, outsourced inmate services, challenges operating correctional facilities, 
inmate programs, future plans for expansion and closure, and the need and reasons for 
future county correctional institutions. Use of inmates were discussed and how inmates 
are assigned to one of three types of work details (outside contracted work details, 
outside non-contracted work details, and inside work details), the public work that is 
performed, and how inmates are viewed by the public and employees. Lastly, financial 
performance of the correctional institutions was evaluated. According to the analysis, all 
but one of the correctional institutions experienced major financial losses when audited 
revenues and expenses were compared. However, when cost avoidance was factored in of 
not having to hire additional full-time county employees or contractors to perform the 
work inmates perform, all host counties experienced a significant profit/cost avoidance. 
In addition to being profitable and beneficial for the host counties, county correctional 
institutions are also extremely financially beneficial for the state. By outsourcing state 
inmates to less expensive county facilities, the state saved tens of millions of dollars 
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annually. Therefore, hosting an optional county correctional institution is a major 
financial benefit to host counties as well as the state and keeps the incarceration and 
punishment of inmates a governmental function as opposed to punishment being imposed 
by the profit-seeking private sector. Lastly, the findings were compared to the original 
research questions and the literature review and generalizations of the results were 
presented along with a theory of how hosting and operating optional county correctional 




















The Georgia prison system had a lack of correctional facilities and inmate bed 
space since the end of the Civil War due to fiscal constraints and limited resources. State 
prison officials, realizing they were not self-sufficient, were forced to search the external 
environment to locate possible solutions to their limited resources to protect law abiding 
citizens and remove law breaking offenders from the community. In their search, they 
found a solution by outsourcing their inmates to private entities initially through a convict 
lease system from 1868 to 1908 and then through chain gangs and county work camps 
from 1908 to 1943. Even though the chain gangs were abolished in 1943, the work camps 
continued until they were formally established as optional county correctional institutions 
and codified by the state in 1956.  
Georgia struggled to manage its small fledging prison system and inmate 
population for many decades from the 1940s to the 1970s and continued to heavily rely 
on county correctional institutions to house state inmates. To compound the problem, 
Georgia and the entire U.S. experienced increases in violent and property crimes during 
the 1970s and 1980s due to precarious economic conditions that included high 
unemployment, excessive inflation, stagnated wages, outsourcing of jobs to other 
countries, de-industrialization, business bankruptcies, prohibitive interest rates, abnormal 
oil and gas prices, reductions in social spending, and a downward push on employee 
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benefits and pensions. To counter the increases in violent and property crimes, the federal 
and state governments ushered in new “get tough on crime” and “war on drugs” laws 
during the 1980s and 1990s that collectively widened the scope of criminalization and 
ended indeterminate sentencing. These new laws resulted in new convictions, longer 
sentences, mandatory minimum sentences, and reduced eligibility for parole and 
probation which led to an increase in the prison population and ultimately prison 
overcrowding. Georgia elected officials knew they could not build themselves out of 
prison overcrowding, continued to rely on county correctional institutions, and contracted 
with two private for-profit prison services corporations, Core Civic and the GeoGroup, 
during the 1990s to construct four private prisons to house state inmates under 
contractual arrangements to relieve prison overcrowding, avoid constructing new and 
expensive state prisons, and continue their mission of incarceration. In addition to 
creating more inmate bed space through outsourcing, state elected officials also enacted 
many prison reform laws and created numerous councils during the 2010s that created 
non-residential incarceration alternatives such as accountability courts for non-violent 
offenders. The reform measures slowed the prison population escalation but left the 
remaining prison population composed of primarily violent offenders that must be housed 
in the state prison system.  
Outsourcing excess state inmates to other public and private entities reduced the 
state’s prison system’s uncertainty, dependency, and vulnerability, was made possible by 
the adoption of the 13th amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and predicted and explained 
by resource dependence theory (RDT). Outsourcing public services and programs, even 
government inmates’ incarceration, to the private sector and other levels of government 
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has been around since the beginning of the American republic and has evolved into a 
pragmatic, innovative, and well-established alternative to traditional public service 
delivery at all levels of government around the world. 
Today, Georgia operates 34 state prisons and contracts with 21 county 
governments and two private for-profit prison services corporations to house excess state 
inmates in 21 county correctional institutions and four private prisons. Georgia county 
governments that host optional county correctional institutions and private for-profit 
prison services corporations that operate private prisons have the same goal of receiving 
economic benefits by housing state inmates in their facilities. Private prison corporations 
are totally dependent on the state to keep them in business and must maintain and 
increase their profits, market share, and stock prices to remain a going concern. The 
success of this private business model can easily be determined by profit or loss 
statements and other information contained in the corporations’ annual reports. On the 
other hand, county governments that host and operate optional correctional institutions do 
not have the same concerns of profits, market share, stock prices, or business 
continuation that private for-profit prison corporations have, are not dependent on the 
state to keep them in business, and can easily abandon this optional service to the state 
and continue their core local government functions. The success of this public model 
cannot easily be determined as compared to their private sector counterparts.  
The objective of this research project was to explore the census of the 21 Georgia 
county correctional institutions through a qualitative multiple case study to understand 
them in greater detail, determine if their operations were financially successful, educate 
decision makers from Georgia and other states as well as the public about this obscure 
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and unique method of incarceration, and perhaps develop a theory regarding operating 
county correctional institutions. This case study covered the topics of demographic 
characteristics of counties that host optional correctional institutions, correctional 
institutions’ management, facility attributes, use of inmates, and financial performance. 
County correctional institutions and their operations are now demystified and 
understandable. In addition, the research questions have been conclusively answered. 
Bottom line, the studied 19 county governments that host and operate optional county 
correctional institutions received significant financial benefits by having a supplemental 
unpaid inmate labor force perform a variety of needed public work and avoiding the high 
cost of hiring additional county employees or contractors to perform the work that 
inmates perform. The state also saved a significant amount of taxpayer funds by 
outsourcing their inmates to less expensive county correctional institutions. In addition, a 
generalization and a theory have now been developed that indicates, if a Georgia county 
hosts and operates an optional correctional institution based on the model presented in 
this research study, it will receive significant financial benefits and the state will save a 
significant amount of taxpayer funds. This theory can also be expanded by indicating that 
if other states adopt this model of county operated correctional institutions to house state 
inmates that Georgia uses, they and their local governments will reap financial benefits.  
Looking to the future and according to a December 2018 Georgia Department of 
Audits and Accounts Performance Audit Division report, the state inmate population is 
estimated to increase by only 1,277 inmates or about 2.5% over the next five years. That 
anticipated increase in inmate population is expected to contain mostly violent offenders 
that are not suitable to be assigned to county correctional institutions or private prisons 
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and will be housed in state prison facilities with expanded capacity. However, with the 
current civil unrest, defund the police movement, racial conflicts, mass protests, riots, and 
fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic, the inmate population may increase more than the 
2018 report predicts. Future studies are needed to be performed by other Georgia counties 
and other states’ prison officials that do not have this method of incarceration to confirm 
or disprove the aforementioned theory. If confirmed, this incarceration model or any 
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State Prisons’ Locations, Gender Affiliations, Year Opened, Bed Capacities, and Security 
Levels 
 
No.  State Prison/Location/Gender Year Opened Avg. Standard Bed 
Capacities 
Security Levels 
1 Georgia/Reidsville/M 1937 1,019 Special Mission 
2 Arrendale/Alto/F  1951 1,325 Special Mission 
3 GA Diagnostic Center/Jackson/M 1968 2,103 Special Mission 
4 Montgomery/Mt. Vernon/M 1972 387 Medium 
5 Walker/Rock Springs/M 1972 403 Medium 
6 Baldwin/Harwick/M 1976 854 Special Mission 
7 Rutledge/Columbus/M 1976 589 Medium 
8 Central/Macon/M 1978 1,074 Medium 
9 Lee/Leesburg/M 1979 717 Medium 
10 Coastal/Garden City/M 1981 1,698 Special Mission 
11 Augusta/Grovetown/M 1983 1,031 Special Mission 
12 Dodge/Chester/M 1983 1,175 Medium 
13 Rogers/Reidsville/M 1983 1,286 Medium 
14 Burruss/Forsyth/M 1986 711 Special Mission 
15 Helms/Atlanta/Mix 1989 31 Medium 
16 Valdosta/Valdosta/M 1989 778 Close 
17 Hays/Trion/M 1990 699 Close 
18 Phillips/Buford/M 1990 773 Special Mission 
19 Ware/Waycross/M 1990 1,269 Close 
20 Hancock/Sparta/M 1991 813 Close 
21 Washington/Davisboro/M 1991 1,223 Medium 
22 Autry/Pelham/M 1992 1,559 Medium 
23 Johnson/Wrightsville/M 1992 1,352 Medium 
24 Telfair/Helena/M 1992 1,106 Close 
25 Smith/Glennville/M 1993 1,200 Close 
26 Calhoun/Morgan/M 1994 1,438 Medium 
27 Dooly/Unadilla/M 1994 1,590 Medium 
28 Pulaski/Hawkinsville/F 1994 1,123 Medium 
29 Macon/Oglethorpe/M 1994 1,389 Close 
30 Wilcox/Abbeville/M 1994 1,659 Medium 
31 Emanuel/Swainsboro/F 1996 393 Medium 
32 Long/Ludowici/M 2004 203 Medium 
33 Whitworth/Hartwell/F 2013 426 Medium 
34 Metro/Atlanta/M 2018 114 Special Mission 
 Total 33,510  










County Correctional Institutions’ Locations, Year Opened, Contracted Bed Capacities, 
and Security Levels 
 




Avg. Contracted Bed Capacity 
for FY 2017, 2018, 2019 
Security 
Levels 
1 Effingham County/Springfield 1925 192 Medium  
2 Jefferson County/Louisville 1925 145  Medium 
3 Clarke County/Athens 1929 131 Medium 
4 Harris County/Hamilton 1936 150 Medium 
5 Bulloch County /Statesboro 1946 160 Medium 
6 Terrell County/Dawson 1947 140  Medium 
7 Mitchell County/Camilla 1953 138 Medium 
8 Colquitt County/Moultrie 1954 190 Medium 
9 Decatur County/Bainbridge 1954 182 Medium 
10 Screven County/Sylvania 1958 148 Medium 
11 Hall County/Gainesville 1963 200 Medium 
12 Richmond County/Augusta 1963 230 Medium 
13 Coweta County/Newnan 1977 232 Medium 
14 Floyd County/Rome 1977 434 Medium 
15 Jackson County/Jefferson 1989 150 Medium 
16 Sumter County/Americus 1990 350 Medium 
17 Carroll County/Carrollton 1991 246 Medium 
18 Clayton County/Lovejoy 1992 253 Medium 
19 Muscogee County/Columbus 1997 528 Medium 
20 Spalding County/Griffin 2001 384 Medium 
21 Gwinnett County/Lawrenceville 2002 201 Medium 
 Total 4,784  
Source: County Capacity Agreements, 2017, 2018, 2019 and Georgia Department of Audits and Accounts, 
2018 
 
Private Prisons’ Locations, Year Opened, Contracted Bed Capacities, and Security Levels 
 
No.  Private Prison/Location/Company Year Opened Contracted Bed Capacity Security Level 
1 Coffee/Nicholls/Core Civic 1998 2,605 Medium 
2 Wheeler/Alamo/Core Civic 1998 2,597 Medium 
3 Riverbend/Milledgeville/Geo Group 2011 1,481 Medium 
4 Jenkins/Millen/Core Civic 2012 1,135 Medium 
 Total 7,818  















































State Prisons’ Utilization Rates FYE June 30, 2017 to June 30, 2019 
 
FYE State Prison Capacity Inmates Assigned to  
State Prisons 
Utilization Rate 
June 30, 2017 33,981 37,268 109.7% 
June 30, 2018 34,997 37,847 108.1% 
June 30, 2019 35,200 38,201 108.5% 
Total 104,178 113,316 108.8% 
3 Year Average 34,726 37,772 108.8% 
Source: Georgia Department of Corrections, 2020a,b,c 
County Correctional Institutions’ Utilization Rates FYE June 30, 2017 to June 30, 2019 
 
FYE County Correctional 
Institution Capacity 
Inmates Assigned to County 
Correctional Institutions 
Utilization Rate 
June 30, 2017 5,145 4,975 96.7% 
June 30, 2018 4,887 4,691 96.0% 
June 30, 2019 4,943 4,808 97.3% 
Total 14,975 14,474 96.6% 
3 Year Average 4,992 4,825 96.6% 
Source: Georgia Department of Corrections, 2020a,b,c 
Private Prisons’ Utilization Rates FYE June 30, 2017 to June 30, 2019 
 
FYE Private Prison Capacity Inmates Assigned to  
Private Prisons 
Utilization Rate 
June 30, 2017 7,974 7,897 99.0% 
June 30, 2018 7,975 7,819 98.0% 
June 30, 2019 7,975 7,861 98.6% 
Total 23,924 23,577 98.5% 
3 Year Average 7,975 7,859 98.5% 































County Correctional Institution 
Interview Questionnaire / Data Recording Instrument 
 
 
County Correctional Institution: _______________________ Date: _______________ 
 
Community Characteristics  
 
Name of County: _________________________________________________________ 
 
Location in the State: Urban (more than 50,000) __________Rural (less than 50,000) __________ 
 
2019 Population: _________________________________________ (U.S. Census Quick Facts) 
 
2019 Population Percentage Change Since 2010 County/State: __________/_________% 
(U.S. Census Quick Facts)  
 
2019 Demographic Make-up of the County: White: ____% Black: ____% Other: _____% 
(U.S. Census Quick Facts) 
 
2019 Per Capita Income County/State: $____________/__________ (U.S. Census Quick Facts) 
 
2019 Median Household Income County/State: $_______/_________(U.S. Census Quick Facts) 
 
2019 Percentage of Population in Poverty County/State: ___/____% (U.S. Census Quick Facts) 
 
Other Community Information FYE 2017 FYE 2018 FYE 2019 AVG 
County’s Unincorporated 
Millage Rate (GA Dept. of Revenue 
website) 
    
County’s Unemployment Rate 
during July 2017, 18, 19/State 
(Federal Reserve of St. Louis website) 

















Who Hires the Warden: _____________________________________________(Interview) 
 
Total Years of Experience as a County Warden: __________________________(Interview) 
 
Years of Experience at this Location: __________________________________ (Interview) 
 
Does Warden have a Background from GDOC: Yes _________ No__________ (Interview)  
 
Warden’s Current Salary: $ __________________________________________ (Interview) 
 
Housing Style: __________________________________________________(GDOC Document & Interview) 
 
What Year was Institution Originally Opened: ______________________ (GDOC Document) 
 
Continuous Operation Since Originally Opened: Yes______ No _____ Don’t Know____  
(interview) 
 
Security Level: _______________________________________________(GDOC Document) 
 
Are any Institutional Services Outsourced: Yes ______ No ______Don’t Know _______ 
 





Are any Programs Offered to the Inmates: Yes_____ No______ Don’t Know _________ 
 


























Other Institutional Information FYE 2017 FYE 2018 FYE 2019 AVG 
Institution’s Contracted Capacity 
(GDOC Agreements) 
    
Institution’s Avg. Utilization 
Rate (County Compstat Report) 
    
No. of Outside Contracted 
Details/Avg. # of Inmates 
(County Compstat Report) 
    
No. of Outside Non-Contracted 
Details/Avg. # of Inmates (County 
Compstat Report) 
    
No. of Inside Details/Avg. # of 
Inmates (County Compstat Report) 
    
Institution’s # of Budgeted FT / 
PT Dept. Employees (Interview) 
    
 















________________________________________________________________  (Interview) 
 
Are there other inmates, except for state inmates, housed in this facility: Yes ____ No___   
 
If Yes, what type of inmates___________________________________________  
 





When is the County’s Fiscal Year: ______________________________________ (Audit) 
 
Where is the Correctional Institution Accounted for in the Budget:  General Fund ______  
 
Special Revenue Fund ______Enterprise Fund ______ Other Fund_______(Audit) 
   
How Do You Think the Institution Performs Financially:  
 





Audited Revenues FYE 2017 FYE 2018 FYE 2019 AVG 
Daily fee from the state     
Revenues from other entities     
Commissary commissions     
Telephone commissions     
Reimbursements     
Other revenues     
Total Direct Revenues     
Audited Expenses     
Salary and benefits     
Purchased/contracted services     
Supplies     
Other expenses (not capital)     
Total Direct Expenditures     
Direct Profit or (Loss)     
Cost avoidance of not having to 
hire full-time county employees 
or contractors. 
 
(Avg. # of inmates performing 
outside non-contracted work x 
0.75% x $50,000 salary and 
benefits of a new entry-level full-
time county employee) 
    
Profit or (Loss) when cost 
avoidance is factored in.  
    
Potential annual cost savings to 
state due to outsourcing to county. 
 
($44.56 per inmate per day less $20 
per inmate per day x # of avg. inmates 
x 365 days per year). 













Any Plans for Expansion: Yes ________ No ________ Don’t Know__________ (Interview) 
 
Any Plans for Closure: Yes _________ No ________ Don’t Know ___________(Interview) 
 
How are Inmates Viewed/Received by Citizens and Employees Working in/around  
 























______________________________________________________________________(Interview and GDOC question) 
 


















































































Informed Consent Statement 
As a county official of a Georgia county that operates a county correctional institution, 
you are being requested to participate in a telephone interview as part of a research 
project entitled, “A Case Study of Georgia’s 21 County Correctional Institutions.” This 
research project is being conducted by Randall Dowling, a doctoral student at Valdosta 
State University. The purpose of this study is to determine the financial impact the 
correctional institutions have on their host county governments. You will receive no 
direct benefits from participating in this research study. However, your responses may 
help us learn more about the innerworkings of the state’s 21 county correctional 
institutions. There are no foreseeable risks involved in participating in this study other 
than those encountered in day-to-day life. Participation should take approximately one-
half hour by telephone. No one, including the researcher, will be able to associate your 
responses with your identity. Your participation is entirely voluntary. You may choose 
not to participate, to stop responding at any time, or to skip any questions that you do not 
want to answer. You must be at least 18 years of age to participate in this study. Your 
participation in the interview will serve as your voluntary agreement to participate in this 
research project and your certification that you are 18 years of age or older. 
Questions regarding the purpose or procedures of the research should be directed to 
Randall Dowling, at rgdowling@valdosta.edu.   
This study has been approved by the Valdosta State University Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) for the Protection of Human Research Participants.  The IRB, a university 
committee established by Federal law, is responsible for protecting the rights and welfare 
of research participants. If you have concerns or questions about your rights as a research 




































































Demographic Characteristics of Counties Data Set 
 
Trait CI 1 CI 2 CI 3 CI 4 CI 5 CI 6 CI 7 
Rural/Urban U R U R U R R 
Pop. Change 23% (9.2%) 10% 10.1% 13.3% (10.3%) (7%) 














Per Capita Income $29,795 $18,764 $22,589 $34,511 $21,207 $19,330 $17,514 
Med. HH Income $65,153 $34,300 $36,889 $74,261 $41,789 $38,015 $37,027 
Poverty Rate 8.3% 22.3% 27% 8.7% 22.9% 27.8% 29.3% 















































Trait CI 8 CI 9 CI 10 CI 11 CI 12 CI 13 C14 
Rural/Urban R R U U U U U 
Pop. Change 0.2% (5.2%) 13.8% 1% 16.6% 2.3% 20.7% 














Per Capita Income $19,173 $20,397 $27,625 $22,045 $32,542 $25,058 $27,115 
Med. HH Income $35,472 $39,148 $59,898 $40,644 $70,717 $46,367 $62,495 
Poverty Rate 23.9% 23.2% 13.2% 21.9% 10.2% 20.7% 8.7% 















































Trait CI 15 CI 16 CI 17 CI 18 CI 19 CI 20 CI 21 
Rural/Urban R U U U U R U 
Pop. Change (10%) 8.5% 12.6% 2.7% 4% (4.3%) 16.3% 














Per Capita Income $20,191 $24,155 $20,419 $25,318 $22,166 $21,557 $29,474 
Med. HH Income $36,205 $49,608 $45,778 $45,389 $42,671 $37,588 $67,769 
Poverty Rate 25.7% 16.8% 17.6% 20.1% 17.3% 25.9% 9.2% 





















































Rural/Urban Rural = 38%, Urban = 62% 
Pop. Change 5.2% 
Race White/Black White = 60.8%, Black = 34.4% 
Per Capita Income $23,855 
Med. Household Income $47,961 
Poverty Rate 19% 
Avg. Tax Burden 13.977mills 
Avg. Unemployment Rate 4.88% 



























































































Correctional Institutions’ Warden Data Set 
 















Experience (Years)  5 4 6 4 2 2 8 
GDOC Career Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Salary $82,000 $66,000 $98,000 $70,000 $99,000 $52,000 $90,000 
 















Experience (Years) 17 6 8 10 32 7 13 
GDOC Career Yes No No No No No No 
Salary $69,800 $70,000 $116,000 $114,000 $120,000 $89,000 $82,300 
 
Attribute CI 15 CI 16 CI 17 CI 18 CI 19 CI 20 CI 21 














Experience (Years) 18 1 7 9 6 6 7 

















Appointment County Manager = 33%, Board of Comm.= 43%, Combo = 24%  
Experience (Years) 8.5 





























































Facility Attributes Data Set 
 
Attribute CI 1 CI 2 CI 3 CI 4 CI 5 CI 6 CI 7 

















Transition Center No Yes Yes No No No No 
County Inmates No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Utilization Rate 98% 101% 95% 99% 93% 98% 99% 
FT Positions 37 32 43 30 22 14 29 
Expansion No Yes No No No No No 
Closure No No No No No No No 
Additional CIs Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
 
Attribute CI 8 CI 9 CI 10 CI 11 CI 12 CI 13 C14 

















Transition Center No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
County Inmates Yes Yes No No No No No 
Utilization Rate 98% 98% 95% 97% 94% 98% 97% 
FT Positions 22 42 35 77 64 84 35 
Expansion No No No No No No No 
Closure No No No No No No No 
Additional CIs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Attribute CI 15 CI 16 CI 17 CI 18 CI 19 CI 20 CI 21 

















Transition Center No No No No No No No 
County Inmates No No No No No No Yes 
Utilization Rate 99% 99% 93% 98% 97% 95% 97% 
FT Positions 36 58 58 117 86 16 N/A 
Expansion No Yes Yes No No No No 
Closure No No No No No No No 
Additional CIs Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes 
 
Attribute Averages 





Transition Center 6/29% 
County Inmates 6/29% 
Utilization Rate 97% 
FT Positions 47 
Expansion Yes = 14%, No = 86% 
Closure No = 100% 
Additional CIs Yes = 81%, No = 19% 





















































Use of Inmates Data Set 
 
Work Details CI 1 CI 2 CI 3 CI 4 CI 5 CI 6 CI 7 
Avg. No. of Outside 
Contracted Work 
Details/No. of 















Avg. No. of Outside 
Non-Contracted 
Work Details/No. of 















Avg. No of Inside 
Work Details/No. of 
















Work Details CI 8 CI 9 CI 10 CI 11 CI 12 CI 13 C14 
Avg. No. of Outside 
Contracted Work 
Details/No. of 















Avg. No. of Outside 
Non-Contracted 
Work Details/No. of 















Avg. No of Inside 
Work Details/No. of 
















Work Details CI 15 CI 16 CI 17 CI 18 CI 19 CI 20 CI 21 
Avg. No. of Outside 
Contracted Work 
Details/No. of 















Avg. No. of Outside 
Non-Contracted 
Work Details/No. of 















Avg. No of Inside 
Work Details/No. of 
















Work Details Averages 
Avg. No. of Outside Contracted 




Avg. No. of Outside Non-
Contracted Work Details/No. of 
Inmates Per Detail 
 
33/4 
Avg. No. of Inside Work 
























































Correctional Institutions’(CI) Financial Performance Data Set 
 
Financial Item CI 1 CI 2 CI 3 CI 4 CI 5 CI 6 CI 7 





































































































Financial Item CI 8 CI 9 CI 10 CI 11 CI 12 CI 13 C14 



































































































Financial Item CI 15 CI 16 CI 17 CI 18 CI 19 AVG 









































































Savings to State 
 
3,092,718 
 
2,187,314 
 
2,115,598 
 
4,652,524 
 
3,325,792 
 
2,033,346 
Total 
38,633,576 
 
